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We are progressing toward a post-antibiotic world: Antibiotic drugs that could once 
treat basic infections are losing their effectiveness at an accelerating rate.  If this 
trend continues, common illnesses will become potentially deadly, and more complex 
procedures—chemotherapy, surgeries, dialysis—will carry much more significant risk. 
The modern industrial agricultural system may have contributed significantly to this 
state of affairs.  The vast majority of antibiotics sold in the United States each year—
an estimated 70 to 80 percent—are for use in animal agriculture.  These antibiotics 
are primarily administered to food-producing animals at routine, low doses as a cheap 
method of promoting faster growth and preventing disease in crowded, unsanitary 
conditions.  These subtherapeutic doses, however, are also the most conducive to breeding 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  The resistant bacteria bred in animals are then transferred 
to humans through a variety of mechanisms and reduce the efficacy of antibiotic drugs. 
In order to address the increasing problem of antibiotic resistance in humans, it is crucial 
to reduce the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.  How to 
efficiently and cost effectively reduce their use, however, remains unclear, and is not a 
problem traditional command-and-control legislation can solve.
Democratic experimentalist theory offers a compelling framework for addressing this 
problem.  Under the traditional democratic experimentalist model, a central institution 
sets a common goal and then delegates authority to local institutions to experiment 
to achieve that goal.  Local institutions then provide data on their performance to 
the central institution to pool, assess, and re-benchmark.  The federal government has 
identified the importance of reducing antibiotic use in livestock, but beyond articulating 
this goal, has failed to act thus far.  In its place, California has become the first state to 
pass a law banning the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.  This 
legislation is an exemplar of state action with the potential to improve the food system 
and public health both locally and in other states, and it could do so effectively using a 
new, layered iteration of democratic experimentalism.  
The California law is, however, subject to legal challenge under federal preemption 
grounds.  This Article analyzes these grounds and concludes that the law may survive such 
a challenge because it furthers federal objectives in a number of ways and is supported 
by California’s compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens. 
The Article further contends that democratic experimentalist theory also bolsters the 
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types of knowledge-intensive, scientifically uncertain policy areas where experimentation 
is key to problem-solving and especially where there is a threat to public health.  As the 
only state action in this critical area, ensuring the experimentalist implementation of 
the California law and securing its fate against preemption are crucial to addressing the 
threat to public health posed by antibiotic resistance.
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Antibiotics, also known as antimicrobials,1 are critical to modern medicine.  
However, these drugs are losing their effectiveness at an accelerating rate.2  If 
this trend continues unabated, we will lose the ability to treat even the most 
basic infections as we rapidly progress toward a post-antibiotic world.  Com-
mon, everyday illnesses will become potentially deadly, and more complex 
procedures—chemotherapy, surgeries, dialysis—will carry untenable risk.  
This phenomenon has already placed serious burdens on our healthcare system 
and economy, and future forecasts are even more alarming. 
How did we reach this state of affairs?  The modern industrial agricultural 
system may have contributed significantly.  The vast majority of antibiotics sold 
in the United States each year—an estimated 70 to 80 percent—are for use in an-
imal agriculture.3  Although the presence of some antibiotic resistance is scientifi-
cally inevitable, the overuse and misuse of antibiotics accelerates the prevalence of 
these resistant bacteria.  The antibiotics are primarily administered to food-
producing animals at routine, low doses as a cheap method of promoting faster 
growth and preventing disease in crowded, unsanitary conditions.  Incidentally, 
however, these subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics are the most conducive to 
breeding antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  The resistant bacteria bred in animals then 
get transferred to humans through various mechanisms, which reduces the effica-
cy of antibiotic drugs in humans.  This serious threat has been well recognized for 
decades—both by the medical community and the federal government.4  In order 
  
1. This Article uses the terms “antibiotic” and “antimicrobial” synonymously, though by strict 
definition the two are not identical.  All antibiotics are antimicrobials, but not all antimicrobials are 
antibiotics. 
2. CDC, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013), http:// 
www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WKR-SPZ6] 
[hereinafter ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US]. 
3. Joan A. Casey et al., High-Density Livestock Operations, Crop Field Application of Manure, and Risk 
of Community-Associated Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus Infection in Pennsylvania, 173 
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1980, 1980 (2013), http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article 
.aspx?articleid=1738717 [https://perma.cc/Y5UF-TL43]; Lisa Heinzerling, Undue Process at the 
FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and Agency Intransigence, 37 VT. L. REV. 1007, 1010–12 (2013); 
JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE, INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION 
IN AMERICA: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE PEW COMMISSION’S PRIORITY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2013), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-
hopkins-center-for-a-livable-future/_pdf/research/clf_reports/CLF-PEW-for%20Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ST97-JHH2] [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION]. 
4. See FDA, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BY 
THE FDA TASK FORCE IN THE USE OF ANTIBIOTICS IN ANIMAL FEEDS 3, 10 (1972), 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924051104002 [https://perma.cc/6VZG-RLQ2]. 
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to address the increasing problem of antibiotic resistance in humans, it is crucial 
to reduce the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals. 
Resistant strains continue to multiply, with two million illnesses and 23,000 
deaths each year attributed to antibiotic-resistant infections.5  Even so, and de-
spite recognizing the threat, the federal government has been slow to act, and the 
action that it has taken has been ineffectual.  For nearly forty years, the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has failed to follow through on its 1970s threat 
to withdraw approval for subtherapeutic use of antibiotics.6  For fifteen years, fed-
eral legislation that would prohibit the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics has lan-
guished in Congress.7 
Some states have attempted to address the problem with their own legisla-
tion.  To date, only one has succeeded.  In October 2015, California passed the 
first and only state law prohibiting the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-
producing animals, both for growth promotion and disease prevention purposes.8  
The law, which will take effect in January 2018, represents an important step 
forward in the effort to reduce the problematic use of antibiotics.9  In addition to 
banning both subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics, the California law also requires, 
for the first time, data collection on antibiotic use in livestock.10  The FDA cur-
rently does not track the use of antibiotics in livestock or require any data collec-
tion, making it difficult to fully understand the extent of the threat of the 
agricultural use of antibiotics.11  Scientists’ uncertainty over the extent to which 
  
5. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 11 (“Each year in the United 
States, at least 2 million people acquire serious infections with bacteria that are resistant to one or 
more of the antibiotics designed to treat those infections.  At least 23,000 people die each year as a 
direct result of these antibiotic-resistant infections.  Many more die from other conditions that 
were complicated by an antibiotic-resistant infection.”). 
6. Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in the Feed of Animals, 38 Fed. Reg. 9,811, 9,813 (Apr. 20, 
1973) (codified at former 21 C.F.R. § 135.109; renumbered at 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013)); 
Penicillin-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. at 43,772 (Aug. 30, 
1977); Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes: Opportunity 
for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,264 (Oct. 21, 1977); Penicillin and Tetracycline in Animal Feeds, 
Notice of Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,827–28 (Nov. 17, 1978).  See generally Diana R.H. Winters, 
Intractable Delay and the Need to Amend the Petition Provisions of the FDCA, 90 IND. L.J. 1047 
(2015). 
7. Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act of 2015, H.R. 1552, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1552/text [https://perma.cc/ZQ3J-TZ4A]. 




11. Animal Drug and Animal Generic Drug User Fee Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–
14, 127 Stat. 451 (2013).  See generally Qiuzhi Chang et al., Antibiotics in Agriculture and the Risk to 
Human Health: How Worried Should We Be?, 8 EVOLUTIONARY APPLICATIONS 240 (2015) 
(showing the lack of measures requiring data collection or tracking antibiotic use by the FDA). 
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agricultural antibiotic use accelerates human antibiotic resistance is due in large 
part to a lack of data.  The data collection requirement in the California law 
aims to fill this large information gap and will help scientists, and ultimately 
policymakers, better understand the effects of agricultural antibiotic use on 
antibiotic resistance in humans. 
Because this lack of data obscures how to efficiently and effectively reduce 
the overuse of antibiotics in livestock, this problem is not one for traditional 
command-and-control legislation to solve.  Command-and-control legislation is 
direct regulation that clearly states what is and is not legal.  Because this type of 
legislation makes unequivocal prescriptions, it functions well when it is clear how 
to solve a problem legislatively, but does not in cases like this where the right leg-
islative answer is uncertain.  Democratic experimentalist theory, however, offers 
a compelling framework for addressing this problem.  Under the traditional 
democratic experimentalist model, a central institution sets a common goal and 
then delegates authority to experiment to achieve that goal to local institutions, 
which provide data on their performance to the central institution to pool and 
compare.  The central institution assesses local performances and re-benchmarks 
new goals accordingly.   
The federal government has identified the importance of reducing antibi-
otic use in livestock, but beyond this centralized goal setting, has failed to act.  
With the federal government having thus far neglected to address the problem of 
antibiotic resistance in agriculture, this Article proposes that states are uniquely 
positioned to fill the void in information and to provide potential solutions.  Cali-
fornia, for example, should implement its law to delegate authority to production 
firms to experiment with the best mechanisms to efficiently reduce antibiotic use 
in livestock.  It should do so by collecting robust data from these firms on their 
approaches, pooling and comparing that data, and then benchmarking firms to 
improve the worst performers, and perhaps reward the best performers.  What 
would then emerge is a new iteration of democratic experimentalism—what I 
term layered democratic experimentalism—that could offer great promise as a 
hybrid public-private mechanism for policymaking and problem-solving.  In this 
layered democratic experimentalist approach, the federal government identifies 
a goal, and state governments enact an initial benchmark, serve as data collec-
tors and poolers, and delegate authority to local firms to experiment to achieve 
the overarching goal.  As more states enact antibiotics laws, there can also be 
state-level comparisons of best legislative practices to reduce antibiotic use in 
agriculture. 
If implemented strategically and robustly and under this layered democratic 
experimentalist framework, California’s law has groundbreaking potential.  In 
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particular, if California effectively implements its data collection requirements, 
the state would become an epicenter for determining the leading mechanisms to 
reduce the use of antibiotics in livestock, leading the nation in this scientific and 
business management inquiry and also testing the contours and effectiveness of 
layered democratic experimentalism.  California’s potential to be a trailblazer in 
this area is particularly important given that California is a large and influential 
state and also a significant producer of meat.12  California has the most agricul-
ture sales of any state, accounting for nearly 11 percent of the U.S. total and has 
the third largest livestock industry in the country.13  California has a unique op-
portunity to lead the way with groundbreaking experimentation, but it can only 
do so if the data collection component of the law is implemented well.  Ensuring 
strategic and robust data collection will be critical to the law’s success in problem-
solving this threat to public health. 
Although the arguments against preemption are strong, the California law 
may face legal challenge on preemption grounds.  Because the federal and state 
governments have concurrent and often overlapping authority in food legisla-
tion, where federal authority ends and state authority begins is often a hazy 
line.14  Although a state has the power to legislate to protect the health and safety 
of its citizens, it can only do so to the extent the state law does not conflict with 
federal law, whether directly or indirectly.15  It is also often unclear when cer-
tain actions by the federal government, including the FDA, constitute “federal 
law” for the purposes of preemption.16  The California law should survive a 
preemption challenge despite deliberately exceeding the federal scheme because 
it furthers federal objectives in a number of ways and is supported by Califor-
nia’s compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, but a 
court could plausibly find either way on this issue.  This Article argues that dem-
ocratic experimentalism can, however, bolster the argument against preemption.  
  
12. CAL. DEPT. OF FOOD & AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE STATISTICS REVIEW, 88–98 
(2015), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/2015Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7FZ-
8ADS]. 
13. USDA, 2012 Census Highlights, CENSUS OF AGRIC. (May 2014), http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/ 
Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farm_Economics [https://perma.cc/8WA7-
UBHA]. 
14. For example, the federal government has exclusive authority in food labeling, though states may 
have some authority to legislate in this area as well, as indicated by the controversy generated by the 
Vermont Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) labeling law.  See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012); 9 
VT. STAT. ANN. § 3043 (2016); Ross H. Pifer, Mandatory Labeling Laws: What Do Recent State 
Enactments Portend for the Future of GMOs?, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2014). 
15. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
16. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009); Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 
237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Democratic experimentalism should inform preemption doctrine when the poli-
cy area at hand is knowledge-intensive and involves scientific uncertainty, where 
experimentation is key to problem-solving, and especially where there is a threat 
to public health.  Animated by the potential fruits of experimentalism, preemp-
tion doctrine in this context should evolve to favor the democratic experimentalist 
approach. 
As the only state action in this critical area, ensuring the experimentalist 
implementation of the California law and securing its fate against preemption are 
crucial to addressing the threat that overuse of antibiotics poses to public health.  A 
democratic experimentalist–infused preemption doctrine thus becomes critical to 
public health and safety.  How the law is implemented, particularly from a data 
collection perspective, and whether it is preempted could significantly impact the 
advancement of scientific knowledge in this area and the state of human health in 
the decades to come.  It could also have considerable effects on states’ abilities to 
address the critical problem of antibiotic resistance in humans and other similar is-
sues as they emerge.  Finally, the successes or failures of the California law can help 
provide practical guidance to other states on best practices in legislating in this area. 
Part I of this paper provides background on the history of antibiotics and 
elucidates the threat of antibiotic resistance.  Part II introduces democratic exper-
imentalism and presents it as a theoretical lens to inform the problem-solving 
process for reducing the overuse of antibiotics in food-producing animals.  Part 
III gives the history of federal regulation in this area and outlines the new Cali-
fornia antibiotics law.  Part IV situates the federal and state regimes within the 
democratic experimentalist framework.  Part V analyzes federal preemption as 
it applies to the California antibiotics law, concluding that the law should not be 
preempted.  I conclude by arguing that democratic experimentalism should 
inform preemption doctrine in contexts that involve knowledge-intensive and 
scientifically uncertain policy areas.  Finally, I suggest some lessons states can 
learn from the California law’s implementation. 
I. THE RISE OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 
A. Background on Antibiotics and Their Introduction Into Agriculture 
The advent of antibiotic drugs was a miracle of modern medicine, enabling 
doctors to cure once deadly infections in a matter of days.17  Lifesaving medical 
  
17. See, e.g., Stuart B. Levy, The Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, SCI. AM. Mar. 1998, at 46, 
http://www.micro.utexas.edu/courses/kalthoff/bio346/PDF/Readings/08Levy%20(1998).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GTD6-GYCZ]  (“Ever since antibiotics became widely available in the 1940s, 
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procedures that are now commonplace, including surgery, chemotherapy, 
transplants, and kidney dialysis, are successful because of the existence of effective 
antibiotic drugs that combat the risk of infection inherent to these procedures.18  
Antibiotic drugs cure illness, alleviate suffering, and allow humans to live longer 
and healthier lives. 
The profound effects of antibiotic drugs extend beyond humans to animal 
agriculture as well.19  Today, an estimated 70 to 80 percent of all antibiotic drugs 
in the United States each year are sold and distributed for use in animal agricul-
ture.20  In addition to treating specific instances of bacterial infection, antibi-
otic drugs are more commonly administered in low, subtherapeutic doses in 
animal feed and water for two purposes: production—that is, to promote 
growth and feed efficiency—and disease prevention.21  In the late 1940s, phar-
maceutical waste was used as a protein source in animal feeds, and farmers 
soon noticed that these additions appeared to enhance growth rates without a 
corresponding increase in feed consumption.22  Investigation of this phenomenon 
revealed that the antibiotic drugs were responsible for the growth promotion and 
increased feed efficiency, leading to the widespread use of low doses of antibiotic 
drugs in animal feed.23  In addition, as modern industrial agriculture developed, 
producers substantially increased the concentration of animals in their facilities to 
increase profit margins; correspondingly, the sanitary conditions of these farms 
declined.24  The extreme crowding and lack of sanitation that characterize in-
dustrial farming created conditions that put animals at increased risk—indeed, 
unnatural risk—of infection.25  To enable these production conditions, producers 
  
they have been hailed as miracle drugs—magic bullets able to eliminate bacteria without doing 
much harm to the cells of treated individuals.”). 
18. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 24. 
19. See, e.g., Jay P. Graham et al., Growth Promoting Antibiotics in Food Animal Production: An Economic 
Analysis, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 79, 80 (2007) (“The use of antibiotics to enhance growth and 
feed efficiency and reduce mortality in broiler [chicken] production was introduced without 
rigorous testing as to efficacy some 50 years ago.”). 
20. Livestock: Use of Antimicrobial Drugs, Senate Floor Analyses, Senate Rules Committee (Sept. 11, 
2015); Casey et al., supra note 3, at 1; Heinzerling, supra note 3, at 1010–12; INDUSTRIAL FOOD 
ANIMAL PRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 2. 
21. ELLEN K. SILBERGELD ET AL., PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE AND HUMAN HEALTH 9 (2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/ 
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/industrial_agriculture/pcifapantbiorprtvpdf.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8JXD-S4VJ] [hereinafter PEW COMMISSION]. 
22. Id. at 24. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.; KENNETH H. MATHEWS, JR., USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ANTIMICROBIAL DRUG 
USE AND VETERINARY COSTS IN U.S. LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 3 (2001), 
[https://perma.cc/N3UW-XZ6S] (“It is generally conceded that commercial livestock production 
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administer antibiotics prophylactically to prevent the herd- and flock-wide 
spread of disease.26  Antibiotic drugs allow food producers to cut costs by substi-
tuting low doses of antibiotics for other seemingly more costly methods of disease 
prevention such as providing more land for animals and maintaining more sani-
tary living conditions.27 
B. The Rise and Threat of Antibiotic Resistance 
The evolution of bacteria resistant to antibiotic drugs is an inevitable con-
sequence of bacterial reproduction and mutation.  When antibiotic drugs kill 
bacteria, some bacteria resistant to the drugs may survive and reproduce.28  Using 
antibiotic drugs at low levels over a long period of time increases the likelihood 
of resistant bacteria reproducing.29  In 1945, Sir Arthur Fleming warned about 
the dangers of low-dose use of antibiotics as he accepted the Nobel Prize in 
Medicine for his work developing the antibiotic drug penicillin: “It is not diffi-
cult to make microbes resistant to penicillin in the laboratory by exposing them 
to concentrations not sufficient to kill them . . . . [T]here is the danger that the 
ignorant man may easily underdose himself and by exposing his microbes to 
non-lethal quantities of the drug make them resistant.”30  This warning is pre-
cisely the reason that when prescribing a round of antibiotics, doctors today 
strongly emphasize the need for patients to finish the entire prescribed course 
and not prematurely discontinue use when symptoms subside. 
The past seventy-five years of antibiotic use and development have realized 
Fleming’s early fears: We have become Fleming’s “ignorant man.”  Penicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus was identified in 1940, when penicillin was only in limited 
use.31  Antibiotic-resistant bacteria continued to appear as new antibiotic drugs 
were developed.  Tetracycline was introduced in 1950, and tetracycline-
resistant Shigella was identified in 1959.32  As the use of antibiotics became 
more widespread, the time between the introduction of a new antibiotic and the 
  
in the United States, especially confinement production, would be virtually impossible without 
antimicrobial drugs.”). 
26. PEW COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 24. 
27. Id. (finding that U.S. hog producers saved approximately $63 million in feed costs in 1999 due to 
their use of low levels of subtherapeutic drugs, and would have suffered an estimated loss of $45.5 
million if antibiotic use was banned). 
28. Id. at 9. 
29. Id. 
30. Alexander Fleming, Nobel Lecture, Penicillin, in NOBEL LECTURES IN PHYSIOLOGY OR 
MEDICINE 1942–1962, at 83, 93 (1964). 
31. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 28. 
32. Id.   
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first identification of bacterial resistance has often shrunk considerably.  For 
example, levofloxacin was introduced in 1996 and levofloxacin-resistant pneu-
mococcus was identified the same year; Linezolid was introduced in 2000 and 
linezolid-resistant Staphylococcus was identified in 2001; ceftaroline was introduced 
in 2010 and ceftaroline-resistant Staphylococcus was identified in 2011.33  These 
contracted time frames reflect the increasingly widespread problematic uses of 
these drugs.34  Furthermore, and of grave concern, scientists have increasingly 
identified pan-drug resistant bacteria (bacteria showing resistance to all available 
antibiotics).35  Most recently, in November 2015, bacteria resistant to colistin 
were first discovered in China.36  As a drug of last resort, colistin is prescribed 
when all other antibiotics fail, making it an antibiotic of critical importance.  
Just weeks after its initial discovery in China, the resistant bacteria had spread 
to Europe, Asia, and Africa.37  Although the current threat is low because other 
antibiotics can still treat colistin-resistant bacteria, the existence of colistin-
resistant bacteria is significant because it raises the prospect of untreatable infec-
tions in the future.38  These new bacteria have been found in both farms and in 
samples of human infections in Europe, suggesting an interplay between antibi-
otic use in agriculture and the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans.39  
In a 2010 speech before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Director Thomas R. Frieden said: “Without 
continuing to improve on our response to the public health problem of antibiotic 
resistance, we are potentially headed for a post-antibiotic world in which we will 
have few or no clinical interventions for some infections.”40 
Antibiotic resistance poses substantial health, safety, and economic concerns.  
The CDC reports that two million Americans acquire serious antibiotic-resistant 
infections each year, causing 23,000 deaths.41  A study by Tufts University and 




35. Id.; Thomas R. Frieden, M.D., M.P.H., Dir., CDC, Antibiotic Resistance and the Threat to 
Public Health, Statement before the Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Health, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2010), [https://perma.cc/P7F2-BJJF] 
[hereinafter Frieden Statement]. 





40. Frieden Statement, supra note 35. 
41. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 6. 
Contagion Without Relief 561 
 
 
infections had excess hospitals stays of one to two weeks.42  The methicillin-
resistant strain of the bacteria Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), which has made 
headlines in the past several years for its resistance to treatment and its ability to 
thrive in hospital environments, can cause life-threatening bloodstream infec-
tions, pneumonia, and surgical site infections.43 
Antibiotic resistance also imposes significant economic burdens.  The same 
Tufts and Cook County Hospital study estimated that the annual healthcare 
costs of drug-resistant bacterial infections in the United States is between $16.6 
and $26 billion.44  The national economy also suffers: The study estimated that in 
2000, the total societal costs of antibiotic-resistant infections to U.S. households 
was approximately $35 billion, including lost wages, extended hospital stays, and 
premature deaths.45  In addition, these data were collected in 2000, when the rate 
of reported antibiotic-resistant infections was half of what it is now; these esti-
mates are likely quite conservative today.46 
These issues become even more urgent with the recognition that emerging 
economies, including Brazil, India, and China, are projected to increase antibi-
otic use in animal production by upwards of 100 percent by 2030.47  None of 
these countries has prudent antibiotics regulation in place—and some have no 
regulations at all on the use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.48  The 
  
42. Rebecca R. Roberts et al., Hospital and Societal Costs of Antimicrobial-Resistant Infections in a Chicago 
Teaching Hospital: Implications for Antibiotic Stewardship, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
1175, 1175–84 (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19739972 
[https://perma.cc/DQ38-RW5S]. 
43. Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/mrsa 
[https://perma.cc/8XVU-M2ZN]. 
44. Roberts et al., supra note 42; Antibiotic-Resistant Infections Cost the U.S. Healthcare System in Excess 
of $20 Billion Annually, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 19, 2009, 9:00 AM ET), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/antibiotic-resistant-infections-cost-the-us-healthcare-
system-in-excess-of-20-billion-annually-64727562.html [https://perma.cc/K7AT-PGTM]. 
45. Roberts et al., supra note 42; Antibiotic-Resistant Infections Cost the U.S. Healthcare System in Excess 
of $20 Billion Annually, supra note 44. 
46. Roberts et al., supra note 42; Antibiotic-Resistant Infections Cost the U.S. Healthcare System in Excess 
of $20 Billion Annually, supra note 44. 
47. Thomas P. Van Boeckel et al., Global Trends in Antimicrobial Use in Food Animals, 112 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5649, 5650 (2015); Lance B. Price, Professor, George Washington Univ. 
Milken Sch. of Pub. Health, Presentation at Drugs, Animals, and Food: Law & Policy of 
Antibiotics in the Food System, Harvard Law School-UCLA Food Law & Policy Conference 
(Oct. 23, 2015). 
48. See Price, supra note 47.  For example, China has minimal regulations and inadequate monitoring 
and enforcement.  See Hudson Lockett, Antibiotics Abuse Makes China’s Pork Industry a Hotbed for 
Drug-Resistant Bugs, CHINA ECON. REV. (Apr. 13. 2015), http://www.chinaeconomic 
review.com/growth-addiction.  India has few laws governing antibiotic use in food-producing 
animals.  CTR. FOR DISEASE DYNAMICS, ECON., & POLY., ANTIBIOTIC USE AND 
RESISTANCE IN FOOD ANIMALS: CURRENT POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2016), 
http://www.cddep.org/sites/default/files/india_abx_report.pdf.  Brazil has only a few regulations 
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United States imports agricultural products including meat and produce (which 
notoriously carry bacteria from meat products) from all over the world, primarily 
from countries that lack prudent antibiotics regulation including China, Brazil, 
other South American countries, and to a lesser extent India.49  In order to pro-
tect its population, the United States must take the lead in quality control in anti-
biotic use with regard to this imported meat.  But the quick and intercontinental 
spread of colistin-resistant bacteria suggests that the United States must go even 
further in promoting judicious use of antibiotics domestically and globally: Even if 
the United States does not produce antibiotic-treated meat, it will not be insulated 
from the effects of global routine uses of antibiotics.  Given the global conse-
quences of antibiotic resistance, it is imperative for the United States to be a 
leader in devising a comprehensive solution rather than to continue to be a pri-
mary culprit in worsening the problem.  It can begin to do so by reducing and 
eventually eliminating routine use of antibiotics in this country and by requiring 
the same from its trading partners. 
1. The Link Between Agricultural Use and Resistance in Humans 
There are two main classes of use of antibiotic drugs: clinical use in humans 
and agricultural use in food-producing animals.  It is well accepted that the misuse 
of antibiotics in human healthcare is an important contributor to antibiotic 
  
restricting the use of specific antibiotics.  See, e.g., Instrução Normativa No. 14, de 17 de Maio de 
2012, Diário Official da União [D.O.U.] de 18.5.2012 (Braz.) (banning the antibiotics spiramycin 
and erythromycin); Portaria No. 97, Art. 15 § 2, de 28 de Julho de 2008, Ministerio da Agricultura, 
Pecuária e Abastecimento de 29.7.2008 (Braz.) (establishing that animal feed can only contain one 
antibiotic and one anticoccidial). 
49. Brazil is the eighth-largest supplier of agricultural imports to the United States, including $307 
million in red meats each year.  It is also the second-largest supplier of prepared meats ($221.8 
million in 2014).  Brazil, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/brazil [https://perma.cc/FRX6-4GWX]; U.S. Food 
Imports, USDA ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/us-food-imports 
[https://perma.cc/73RL-WKWP] (follow “Meats and Meat Products” hyperlink under “Value of 
U.S. food imports, detailed tables by food group”); USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., 
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/923Z-3A96].  China is the third-
largest supplier of agricultural imports to the United States and the third-largest supplier of poultry 
($24.8 million in 2014).  The People’s Republic of China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-
china [https://perma.cc/7CB7-NLN8]; U.S. Food Imports, supra; USDA FOREIGN AGRIC. 
SERV., supra.  India is the fifth-largest supplier of agricultural imports to the United States.  India, 
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-
asia/india [https://perma.cc/9Z9J-NTQY]. 
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resistance and a problem in all healthcare settings.50  According to the CDC, 
prescribing antibiotics in outpatient settings could be reduced by more than 30 
percent without worsening health outcomes for patients.51  But to what extent 
does the overuse and misuse of antibiotics in agriculture affect the prevalence of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans?  It is undisputed that antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria have breached the species barrier between food-producing animals and 
humans multiple times, making it plausible that resistant pathogens acquired 
from livestock have a direct effect on human health.52  The scientific evidence 
has found that the “possibility for animal-to-human transmission . . . brings 
heightened concerns about livestock as potential reservoirs of zoonotic infections 
that may with further evolution become adapted to circulation within the human 
population.”53  It is important to note that due to limited data and the complexity 
of studying the epidemiology of transmission, scientists do not yet know the pre-
cise mechanisms through which the transfer of resistant bacteria occurs, nor the 
extent to which these transfers are occurring, making it difficult to quantify the 
relationship between antibiotic use in animals and the occurrence of clinical 
resistance in humans.54  However, in the most comprehensive assessment of the 
topic to date, an expert panel of the World Health Organization (WHO), Food 
and Agriculture Organization, and World Organization for Animal Health 
found “clear evidence of adverse human health consequences due to resistant 
organisms resulting from non-human usage of antimicrobials.”55  In addition, 
numerous studies have traced human infection by drug-resistant pathogens back 
to animal sources.56 
The transfer of antibiotic-resistant bacteria from food-producing animals to 
the human population occurs in various ways: through food-borne contact (such 
  
50. Alicia Demirjian et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Getting Smart About Antibiotics, 64 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 871, 871 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
mm6432a3.htm [https://perma.cc/8V48-WPDP]. 
51. Battle of the Bugs: Fighting Antibiotic Resistance, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resources 
ForYou/Consumers/ucm143568.htm [https://perma.cc/VX26-PA29]. 
52. Chang, supra note 11. 
53. Id. at 242–43. 
54. Id.; Henrik C. Wegener, Antibiotic Resistance—Linking Human and Animal Health, in 
IMPROVING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH A ONE HEALTH APPROACH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 
331 (Eileen R. Choffnes et al. eds., 2012). 
55. Wegener, supra note 54, at 334. 
56. See, e.g., Timothy F. Jones et al., An Outbreak of Community-Acquired Foodborne Illness Caused by 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 82 (2002); 
M. Teuber, Spread of Antibiotic Resistance With Food-Borne Pathogens, 56 CELLULAR & 
MOLECULAR LIFE SCI. 755 (1999); David G. White et al., The Isolation of Antibiotic-Resistant 
Salmonella From Retail Ground Meats, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1147 (2001); David G. White et 
al., Antimicrobial Resistance of Foodborne Pathogens, 4 MICROBES & INFECTION 405 (2002). 
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as meat consumption); direct animal contact; and environmental contact, partic-
ularly when manure is spread via air, water, dust, and soil.57  Food-borne contact 
occurs when antibiotic-resistant bacteria remains on meat that is not processed 
or cooked properly and spreads to humans.58  It can also occur when fertilizer or 
water containing animal feces and antibiotic-resistant bacteria is used on food crops 
that are then ingested by humans.59  This route of exposure and the nonfood-borne 
routes of exposure mean that consumers may not even need to eat meat to be 
affected by antibiotic resistance.  The nonfood routes of exposure also suggest 
that those who live nearer to production facilities may be at greater risk to envi-
ronmental exposure.60 
Despite the knowledge that misuse of antibiotic drugs hastens the evolution 
of drug-resistant bacteria and that antibiotic-resistant bacteria in food-producing 
animals can transfer to humans, misuse of antibiotics in agriculture has shown no 
signs of slowing down.61  In fact, their misuse continues to increase despite sig-
nificant outbreaks of drug-resistant bacteria and mounting evidence showing 
the increasing proliferation and consequences of antibiotic resistance, including 
from use in agriculture.62  The most recent data show that sales and distribution of 
medically important antibiotic drugs for use in food-producing animals increased 
23 percent from 2009 to 2014.63  It is difficult to determine actual usage figures 
with certainty because data on antibiotic administration in food-producing ani-
mals are extremely limited and the FDA is only required to collect and report 
data on sales, and not on actual usage.   Using sales data as a proxy, however, sug-
gests that actual usage is also likely to be high.64 
Another relevant question is whether the antibiotics administered to food-
producing animals are the same as those administered to humans, such that the 
generation of bacteria resistant to the animal drugs would have any effect on 
  
57. See PEW COMMISSION, supra note 21, at 7–9; see also ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN 
THE US, supra note 2, at 36–37; Casey et al., supra note 3. 
58. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 14. 
59. Id. 
60. See Casey et al., supra note 3, at 1989. 
61. See FDA, 2014 SUMMARY REPORT ON ANTIMICROBIALS SOLD OR DISTRIBUTED FOR USE 
IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS 6 (2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/User 
Fees/AnimalDrugUserFeeActADUFA/UCM476258.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS9D-CEBA]. 
62. See ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 11. 
63. FDA, supra note 61, at 6. 
64. See MARGARET MELLON ET AL., HOGGING IT: ESTIMATES OF ANTIMICROBIAL ABUSE IN 
LIVESTOCK (2001), http://www.iatp.org/files/Hogging_It_Estimates_of_Antimicrobial_Abuse_ 
in.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KHR-RHH4]; Ralph Loglisci, New FDA Numbers Reveal Food Animals 
Consume Lion’s Share of Antibiotics, CTR. FOR A LIVABLE FUTURE (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.livablefutureblog.com/2010/12/new-fda-numbers-reveal-food-animals-consume-
lion%E2%80%99s-share-of-antibiotics [https://perma.cc/2GPL-QYKK]. 
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humans.  In short, the answer is yes.  As of 2014, 62 percent of the antibiotics 
administered to food-producing animals were medically important to humans.65  
Because these antibiotics are the same or substantially similar to those used on 
humans, as antibiotic-resistant bacteria spread, the treatment of humans becomes 
less effective and the rates of antibiotic-resistant infections grow.66 
In 2003, the National Academy of Science’s Institute of Medicine stated: 
“Clearly, a decrease in the inappropriate use of antimicrobials in human medicine 
is not enough.  Substantial efforts must be made to decrease inappropriate overuse 
of antimicrobials in animals and agriculture as well.”67  The CDC68 and WHO69 
agree, joining a chorus of scientific, public health, and environmental profes-
sionals70 who recognize the threat current industrial farm practices pose and who 
have specifically targeted animal agriculture as an area of needed regulation and 
private sector behavior change.71  However, antibiotics are attractive to food 
producers because they enable those producers to use less feed and to maintain 
less sanitary conditions and smaller, cramped living spaces.72  The perception 
  
65. FDA, supra note 61, at 30. 
66. See INDUSTRIAL FOOD ANIMAL PRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 2.  See generally PEW 
COMMISSION, supra note 21; Roberts et al., supra note 42. 
67. MARK S. SMOLINKSI ET AL., MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH: EMERGENCE, 
DETECTION AND RESPONSE 207 (2003). 
68. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE US, supra note 2, at 37 (recognizing that 
“[s]cientists around the world have provided strong evidence that antibiotic use in food-producing 
animals can harm public health” and concluding that “antibiotics should be used in food-
producing animals only under veterinary oversight and only to manage and treat infectious diseases, 
not to promote growth”). 
69. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 37 (2001), http://www.who.int/drugresistance/WHO_Global_ 
Strategy_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8B-NNNG] (recognizing that inappropriate 
antibiotic use poses an emerging public health threat and that antibiotics are commonly misused in 
animal production, and recommending that governments “terminate or rapidly phase out the use of 
antibiotics for growth promotion if they are also used for treatment of humans”). 
70. See generally Jerome A. Paulson & Theoklis E. Zaoutis, Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Agents 
in Animal Agriculture: Implications for Pediatrics, 136 PEDIATRICS 1670 (2015); REVIEW ON 
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, ANTIMICROBIALS IN AGRICULTURE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: REDUCING UNNECESSARY USE AND WASTE (2015), http://amr-
review.org/Publications (follow “8 December 2015-Antimicrobials in agriculture” hyperlink) 
[https://perma.cc/XQ98-D4GK]; Van Boeckel et al., supra note 47; FDA, supra note 61; Putting 
Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America, PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM 
ANIMAL PRODUCTION FANSITE, http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7H2G-9JEM]. 
71. See generally PEW COMMISSION, supra note 21. 
72. See LISA Y. LEFFERTS ET AL., FEED FOR FOOD PRODUCING ANIMALS: A RESOURCE ON 
INGREDIENTS, THE INDUSTRY, AND REGULATION, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR A LIVABLE 
FUTURE 6 (2007), http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-
for-a-livable-future/_pdf/research/clf_reports/animal_feed.pdf [https://perma.cc/63KT-BXTB]; 
MATHEWS, supra note 25, at 3.  But see Jay P. Graham et al., Growth Promoting Antibiotics in Food 
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traditionally has been that reducing prophylactic antibiotic use would significantly 
raise costs for many food producers, which has led some in the animal agriculture 
industry to oppose these efforts.73  It is unclear, however, that these concerns are 
merited.  In Denmark, the economic impacts of banning the subtherapeutic use 
of antibiotics have been minimal.74  The ban has resulted in an increased pro-
duction cost for hogs of just over 1 percent and no net increase in costs for poul-
try production.75  Overall, the combination of production effects on hogs and 
poultry farmers has caused a loss of just 0.03 percent to Denmark’s economy.76   
In addition, even though some large food chains have committed to phas-
ing out the use of antibiotics in the meat in their products over the next decade,77 
industry resistance and continually rising rates of antibiotic use draw into question 
whether voluntary measures can be effective and whether their timeframe is 
acceptable.  These doubts are amplified when taking into account that many 
emerging economies that export meat to the United States are projected to more 
than double their use of antibiotics in the next fifteen years.78  More likely, the 
realities of modern industrial farm animal production will require regulation to 
stem the growing rates of antibiotic resistance. 
Finally, it is important to mention the realistic potential effect of regulating 
antibiotic use in food-producing animals.  Evidence from Denmark, where the 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals is banned, has shown 
that since the ban, human resistance trends appear to be mirroring the decline in 
use of antibiotics in agriculture.79  Some studies suggest that regulation may have 
  
Animal Production: An Economic Analysis, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 79, 80 (2007) (collecting large-
scale empirical data collected by U.S. industry that demonstrates that the use of growth-promoting 
antibiotics in poultry production is associated with economic losses to producers). 
73. See MATHEWS, supra note 25 (stating in its abstract that “discontinuing the use of antimicrobial 
drugs in hog production would initially decrease feed efficiency, raise food costs, reduce production 
and raise prices to consumers”); Scott M. Russell, Ban Antibiotics in Poultry? Why the Policymakers 
Have It Wrong, WATT POULTRY USA, Mar. 2003, at 16, 22. 
74. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AVOIDING ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: DENMARK’S BAN ON 





77. See, e.g., Jennifer Hackett, Subway Joins Other Fast-Food Giants to Cut Back on Antibiotics, SCI. AM. 
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/subway-joins-other-fast-food-giants-
to-cut-back-on-antibiotics [https://perma.cc/AW2C-665T]; Stephanie Strom, McDonald’s 
Moving to Limit Antibiotic Use in Chickens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/03/05/business/mcdonalds-moving-to-antibiotic-free-chicken.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/7SH6-DPP3]. 
78. Van Boeckel et al., supra note 47, at 5649–54; Price, supra note 47. 
79. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 74. 
Contagion Without Relief 567 
 
 
little effect on reducing the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant bacteria already 
present in humans.80  Instead, “the greatest value in restricting antibiotics use, as is 
the case in human medicine, may not be in reversing resistance, but in preventing 
further increases in prevalence.”81  It is possible that the antibiotic resistance that 
has already occurred and spread to humans cannot be undone.  In light of this 
potential irreversibility, it is imperative to minimize the development of new 
resistant strains of bacteria for current drugs that have not yet led to resistant 
bacteria, and for future antibiotics that have yet to be developed.  In either case—
whether to reverse antibiotic resistance in humans or prevent future increases—it 
is important to begin regulating the misuse of antibiotics in food-producing ani-
mals immediately to reduce threats to public health, particularly where there is a 
risk those threats will become irreversible in the future.  To maximize efficiency, 
legislators should consider using a democratic experimentalist framework in 
enacting these laws. 
II. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM 
A. Introduction to Democratic Experimentalism 
Democratic experimentalism is a process of developing laws and policies in 
which central institutions delegate authority to subnational jurisdictions to pursue 
generally declared goals.82  The central institution plays a managerial role, using 
information gathered from local institutions to assess and compare local perfor-
mances and then to reassess and revise initial benchmarks.83  Under the democratic 
experimentalist model, the centralized government works with autonomous and 
decentralized local actors to develop efficient and adaptable rules that respond to 
local conditions and participating actors.84  Democratic experimentalism thus 
combines respect for local variation with centrally coordinated structure and disci-
pline.85  Its central thrust is to induce continuous learning and revision of standards, 
emphasizing deliberative engagement among officials and stakeholders.86 
  
80. Chang, supra note 11, at 244. 
81. Id. 
82. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative 
State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54–55 (2011). 
83. See id. at 79. 
84. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 267, 316–17 (1998). 
85. Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 78. 
86. Id. at 55. 
568 64 UCLA L. REV. 550 (2017) 
 
 
Democratic experimentalist scholars contend that this form of lawmaking—
developed in the private sphere and transplanted into the public sphere—has 
great potential to help solve seemingly intractable problems of our time, espe-
cially in the context of the modern administrative state.87  Indeed, although 
democratic experimentalism has thus far maintained a somewhat low profile in 
legal scholarship, it has manifested in practice in several recent regulatory initia-
tives, including for example the Food Safety Modernization Act and the Race to 
the Top Education program.88  In order to understand the salience of democratic 
experimentalism to modern problem-solving, it is important to understand the 
context in which the modern administrative state arose and the ways in which it 
has subsequently shifted. 
The modern administrative state arose in a context in which the primary 
problem in legislating could be identified as “official ignorance”: Congress did not 
have adequate expertise to make law in certain areas.  Recognizing the limits of its 
knowledge, it created expert administrative agencies and delegated to them the 
authority to regulate in the relevant areas.89  Over the past eighty years, however, 
“the problem has shifted from ignorance to uncertainty”: The impediment to 
effective lawmaking is no longer congressional ignorance, but rather uncertainty 
on the part of all players about how to solve a new set of seemingly intractable 
problems.90  Expertise is insufficient to solve problems whose solutions are uncer-
tain, such as those associated with antibiotic resistance, and also for example, 
pollution, police abuse, prisons, welfare, housing, education, mental health, and 
so on.91  Instead, pervasive uncertainty about how best to solve these problems 
requires joint collaboration, experimentation, and empirical testing of potential 
solutions.92  Democratic experimentalist theory emerges as an attractive and 
pragmatic new approach to problem-solving—and perhaps unsurprisingly, one 
that regulatory initiatives are increasingly, albeit unknowingly, adopting.  Precisely 
because it is premised on continuous learning, deliberative engagement, and revi-
sion of standards, democratic experimentalism deals directly with the problem of 
uncertainty, promising improved substantive outcomes.  In giving rise to a newly 
conceived democratic community,93 it also gives rise to an improved democratic 
  
87. See Charles Sabel, Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism, 9 CONTEMP. 
PRAGMATISM 35, 42 (2012); Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 55. 
88. Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 55–56. 
89. Sabel, supra note 87, at 42. 
90. Id. at 43. 
91. See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004). 
92. See Sabel, supra note 87, at 43. 
93. Id. 
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process for problem-solving and legislating.  Both procedurally and substantively, 
democratic experimentalism offers significant potential. 
B. Democratic Experimentalism And Antibiotics 
Democratic experimentalist theory contends that “policy experimentation 
is central to optimal policy choices.”94  Certain problems—including the sub-
therapeutic use of antibiotics—are particularly well suited to applying demo-
cratic experimentalism as a regulatory framework and problem-solving 
mechanism.  Scientifically related problems and policies especially lend them-
selves to experimentalism.  Because the trial and error approach lies at the heart of 
scientific inquiry, experimentation is especially well suited to scientific policies and 
regulatory cultures, including, for example, the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy95 and the Food Safety Modernization Act.96  In the face of a scientific question 
and scientific uncertainty—such as how to reduce air pollution, improve food 
safety, or eliminate subtherapeutic antibiotic use—it is critical to combine experi-
mentation with multi-stage, continuous feedback policymaking97 to solve 
problems as efficiently and swiftly as possible.  Efficient, swift problem-solving 
derived from experimentalism is even more critical where a problem presents 
a significant threat to public health and risks widespread or long-term harm if 
left unaddressed—as in the case of antibiotic resistance.   
In addition, like air pollution, antibiotic-resistant bacteria are an uncontain-
able externality whose harm is not immediately attributable to any one source.  
There is little incentive for private actors to abate their subtherapeutic antibiotic use 
unless all other private actors also do so, and indeed, the positive effects of eliminat-
ing subtherapeutic antibiotic use are not maximized unless all actors participate.98  
Without unanimous collective action to eliminate subtherapeutic doses, resistant 
bacteria will continue to breed and spread at unacceptable rates.  Pragmatic gov-
ernment action beyond voluntary guidelines is necessary to address this unpriced 
externality of breeding antibiotic-resistant pathogens.   
  
94. Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 557 (2015). 
95. Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 129–30, 153 (2014). 
96. Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 55–56. 
97. See Gubler, supra note 95, at 129–31. 
98. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL ACTION PLAN ON ANTIMICROBIAL 
RESISTANCE (2015), http://www.wpro.who.int/entity/drug_resistance/resources/global_action_ 
plan_eng.pdf (“[S]ystematic misuse and overuse of these drugs in human medicine and food 
production have put every nation at risk.  Few replacement products are in the pipeline.  Without 
harmonized and immediate action on a global scale, the world is heading towards a post-antibiotic 
era in which common infections could once again kill.”). 
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At the same time that structured, disciplined government action is necessary, 
the regulatory scheme must also be adequately flexible to account for significant 
local variances associated with reducing subtherapeutic antibiotic use.  The intri-
cacies of eliminating subtherapeutic antibiotic use vary according both to locality 
and type of animal, whether pigs, cattle, or poultry, such that a top-down, 
command-and-control approach will not adequately account for local circum-
stances to be effective.  Democratic experimentalism provides a key theoretical 
lens for regulating in the antibiotics context, because it accounts for the scien-
tific nature of the problem and its critical threat to public health, and mandates 
structured, disciplined action while still flexibly accounting for local circumstances.  
This Article turns next to a history of federal and state action in antibiotics regu-
lation before explaining how to adapt democratic experimentalist theory in the 
agricultural antibiotics context. 
III. FEDERAL AND STATE ACTION IN ANTIBIOTICS REGULATION 
A. History of Federal Regulation in Antibiotics 
The history of federal action in the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-
producing animals is long and complex, spanning nearly sixty-five years and across 
all three branches of the federal government.  A comprehensive understanding of 
the intricate web of FDA action, executive action, and congressional action and 
inaction, punctuated by judicial action, is crucial to analyzing whether and how 
preemption arguments will apply to state laws regulating subtherapeutic antibi-
otic use and to understanding how democratic experimentalism can best be 
adapted to address this problem. 
1. FDA and Judicial Action 
In the 1950s, the FDA, acting pursuant to its authority under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to approve new animal drugs, approved 
applications for the use of various antibiotics in food-producing animals at 
subtherapeutic levels for the purposes of growth promotion, feed efficiency, 
and disease prevention.99  The FDA approved that the antibiotics could be 
administered on a herd- or flock-wide basis, rather than to specific diseased an-
imals.100  At the time, little was known about the effects that routine, low-level 
  
99. See NRDC v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 
2014); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) (2012). 
100. NRDC, 872 F. Supp. 2d. at 322. 
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use of antibiotics on food-producing animals could have on increased antibiotic 
resistance in humans.101  By the late 1960s, however, scientific evidence began 
to link the two.102  In 1970, FDA responded by assembling a task force of scien-
tists from the FDA, the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the CDC, academia, and industry, to study the risks associated 
with this routine use of subtherapeutic antibiotics in agriculture.103  The task 
force report, published in 1972, found that the prevalence of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria in humans had increased; the use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, 
especially at subtherapeutic levels, promotes the development of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria; animals that consume antibiotics may serve as a reservoir of 
antibiotic pathogens, which can produce human infections; and the prevalence 
of bacteria carrying transferable resistant genes for multiple antibiotics had 
increased in animals—which it found was related to the subtherapeutic use of 
antibiotics.104  Among other recommendations, the task force urged that antibi-
otics that are medically important to humans be prohibited from use in food-
producing animals unless they met safety criteria established by the FDA.105  It 
also recommended that several specific antibiotics only be used therapeutically 
unless they met specific safety criteria for non-therapeutic use.106 
In response to the task force findings, the FDA in 1973 proposed to withdraw 
approval for all subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics in food-producing animals 
unless industry submitted data within two years that resolved conclusively the 
safety of such antibiotic use, pursuant to specific FDA criteria.107  Among the 
most important of these criteria was the requirement that subtherapeutic use of 
an antibiotic drug be shown not to promote increased antibiotic resistance in 
humans.108   
The withdrawal of approval did not take place in 1975 as threatened.  Instead, 
after reviewing the evidence industry submitted, in 1977, the FDA proposed to 
withdraw approval of all subtherapeutic uses of penicillin in livestock and to restrict 




103. See FDA, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BY 
THE FDA TASK FORCE IN THE USE OF ANTIBIOTICS IN ANIMAL FEEDS, supra note 4, at 3. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 10. 
106. See id. 
107. See Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in the Feed of Animals, 38 Fed. Reg. 9,811, 9,813 (Apr. 20, 
1973) (codified at former 21 C.F.R. § 135.109; renumbered at 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013)). 
108. See Penicillin-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,772, 43,774 (Aug. 
30, 1977). 
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drugs in this manner was no longer safe.109  The agency issued notices of an 
opportunity for hearing over the proposed withdrawal and over twenty drug 
sponsors requested hearings, but the hearings were never held and the FDA never 
took any further action on the proposed withdrawals.110  In the early 1980s, the 
FDA began approving new animal drug applications for the subtherapeutic use 
of penicillin and tetracycline in food-producing animals.111  Counterintuitively, 
given its previous finding that the subtherapeutic use of these antibiotics was no 
longer safe, the FDA stated that new drug approvals should not be denied while 
it conducted its ongoing research into their safety.112 
For twenty years, the FDA took no action.  In 1999, five advocacy groups 
submitted a Citizen Petition to the FDA requesting that it follow through with 
revoking approval of the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics as it pledged to do in 
1973 and 1977.113  The FDA issued two tentative responses in 1999 and 2001 
stating that it could not make a final decision at that time.114  Several other advo-
cacy groups filed another petition in 2005 with a similar request, again with no 
agency response.115  In the face of another decade of FDA silence, in May 2011, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and several other advocacy 
organizations filed a lawsuit against the FDA, seeking to compel the agency to 
initiate proceedings to withdraw approval of the subtherapeutic use of penicillin 
and tetracycline in livestock.116  The lawsuit alleged that the FDA had unlawfully 
“withheld agency action” in violation of the FDCA and the Administrative 
Procedure Act and that the FDA was obligated by its 1977 findings to withdraw 
approvals of the relevant drugs.117  During the lawsuit, the FDA finally responded 
to the 1999 and 2005 Citizen Petitions, denying them both.118  The district 
  
109. See Penicillin-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. at 43,774; 
Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes: Opportunity for 
Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,264, 56,264 (Oct. 21, 1977). 
110. See Penicillin and Tetracycline in Animal Feeds, Notice of Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,827, 53,827 
(Nov. 17, 1978); see also NRDC v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 
151 (2d Cir. 2014); Winters, supra note 6, at 1061. 
111. Withdrawal of Approval, 48 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Feb. 1, 1983); see New Animal Drugs for Use in 
Animal Feeds; Penicillin-and Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing 
Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. 4490, 4490 (proposed Feb. 1, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 558). 
112. New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin-and Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and 
Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. at 4490–91; Winters, supra note 6, at 1061. 
113. See generally NRDC v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 760 F.3d 151 (2d 
Cir. 2014). 
114. See id. at 325. 
115. Winters, supra note 6, at 1062–63. 
116. NRDC v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 137 n.6. 
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court found for the plaintiffs and directed the FDA to begin the withdrawal 
proceedings.119 
While the case was on appeal, in 2012, the FDA issued its finalized Guidance 
for Industry #209 on the Judicious Use of Medically Important Antimicrobial 
Drugs in Food-Producing Animals.120  Because of the time and expense of 
withdrawal proceedings, the FDA advocated against withdrawal of approval and 
in favor of a voluntary system of industry withdrawal as a more efficient strategy 
to reduce subtherapeutic antibiotic use in animals.121  Guidance #209 established 
the voluntary framework for this reduction.  It recommended that the “use of 
medically important antimicrobial drugs in food-producing animals should be 
limited to those uses that are considered necessary for assuring animal health” and 
to bring the use of antibiotics under the oversight of licensed veterinarians.122  
The FDA followed up one year later in December 2013 with Guidance for 
Industry #213, which provides recommendations on how to voluntarily comply 
with Guidance #209.123  The next year, in 2014, the Second Circuit reversed 
the district court in the NRDC case, finding that the FDA had acted within its 
authority by not withdrawing approval of the subtherapeutic drugs.124  Although 
the public interest organizations ultimately lost this case, it likely played a role in 
prompting the FDA to publish its voluntary guidance documents.125 
  
119. Id. at 151. 
120. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY #209: THE JUDICIOUS USE OF MEDICALLY IMPORTANT 
ANTIMICROBIAL DRUGS IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS (2012), http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM21
6936.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5VW-6L3P]. 
121. Id. at 20. 
122. Id. at 21. 
123. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY #213: NEW ANIMAL DRUGS AND NEW ANIMAL DRUG 
COMBINATION PRODUCTS ADMINISTERED IN OR ON MEDICATED FEED OR DRINKING 
WATER OF FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRUG SPONSORS FOR 
VOLUNTARILY ALIGNING PRODUCT USE CONDITIONS WITH GFI #209 (2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/Guidancef
orIndustry/UCM299624.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q4E-VVSH].  Guidance #213 includes 
nonbinding recommendations intended to inform new animal drug producers how to comply 
voluntarily with the principles outlined in Guidance #209.  Guidance #213 requests that drug 
companies voluntarily withdraw approvals to market antibiotics for use in animal feed and water for 
“production purposes” such as growth promotion and feed efficiency.  It also requests that 
companies voluntarily amend approvals to market antibiotics over the counter so that a veterinary 
prescription or veterinary feed directive (VFD) is required to purchase and use these drugs in feed 
and water. 
124. See NRDC v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2014). 
125. Press Release, NRDC, NRDC Petitions FDA: Agency’s Weak Attempt to Curb Antibiotic 
Abuse in the Livestock Industry Is Failing (Sept. 13 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/media/ 
2016/160913 [https://perma.cc/8KHA-39G2]. 
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Finally, in October 2015, the FDA’s Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD), a 
final rule, came into effect and created a legal loophole for the subtherapeutic use 
of antibiotics.126  A VFD drug is defined as a new animal drug intended for use in 
animal feed that can only be used under veterinary supervision.127  This category 
of drugs can be distinguished from over-the-counter drugs (which do not require 
a prescription or any veterinary oversight) and prescription drugs (which require a 
prescription from a veterinarian and a pharmacist to dispense).128  At present, all 
products affected by FDA’s plan—feed-use antibiotic drugs used for production 
purposes—are available over-the-counter.129  However, if drug sponsors, who 
own the right to market the product, voluntarily modify the use conditions of 
their antibiotic feed drugs per Guidance #213 so that the drugs require veterinary 
supervision, the drugs will then become VFD drugs.130  Twenty-five out of 
twenty-six of the current drug sponsors, representing over 99.95% of the total 
sales of products affected by Guidance #213,131 have committed to change the 
use conditions of their feed-use drugs so that they are VFD.132  By voluntarily 
changing their drugs’ use conditions, drug sponsors bind the drugs to the condi-
tions of this final rule, which prohibits using antibiotic drugs for growth promotion 
or feed efficiency. The drugs can then only be used for therapeutic purposes, 
including subtherapeutic disease prevention.133  To comply with the guidance, 
pharmaceutical companies will simply have to remove “growth promotion” as an 
indication from the affected drugs’ labels.  Producers can continue to use the 
drugs in the same way as before but must say they are now using them for disease 
prevention purposes rather than growth promotion purposes.134 
  
126. Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,708, 31,708 (June 3, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 514, 558). 
127. Id. at 31,708. 
128. Id. 
129. FDA’s Strategy on Antimicrobial Resistance-Questions and Answers, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm216939.htm 
[http://perma.cc/CB56-Z73P]. 
130. Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. at 31,710. 
131. These twenty-five drug sponsors hold 99.6 percent of the applications affected by Guidance #213 
and represent 99.95 percent of the total sales of products affected by Guidance #213. FDA Update 
on Animal Pharmaceutical Industry Response to Guidance #213, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AntimicrobialResistance/JudiciousUseofAntimicrobials/ucm390
738.htm [https://perma.cc/5WBC-Q6XG].  The one company that has not agreed to participate in 
the FDA’s voluntary plan, Pharmaq AS, makes a drug used only in fish.  Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA’s 
Continuing Incapacity on Livestock Antibiotics, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 325, 334–35 (2014).   
132. FDA Update on Animal Pharmaceutical Industry Response to Guidance #213, supra note 131. 
133. Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. at 31,710. 
134. Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 337–43. 
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This loophole perhaps suggests why drug sponsors have been so easily 
convinced to comply with the VFD.  Indeed, one drug sponsor has stated it does 
not anticipate any drop in revenues as a result of complying with the FDA 
plan,135 and another is planning to have its drug reclassified as prevention-related 
rather than production-related to bypass this hurdle.136  Bacteria, however, do not 
distinguish between low doses of antibiotics administered for production purposes 
and low doses administered for disease prevention.  By leaving this loophole open 
and giving veterinarians wide discretion to approve antibiotic drug use, the 
FDA’s voluntary plan is poised to have little to no actual effect on reducing antibi-
otic use in food-producing animals.137 
It is of particular note that Guidance #209 and the VFD are the first time 
the FDA has ever drawn a distinction between production and disease prevention 
in evaluating antibiotic risk.138 Since the early 1970s and as recently as 2003 and 
2012, the FDA has not distinguished between the two when referring to subthera-
peutic uses of antibiotics that need to be eliminated.139  The FDA provides no rea-
soning for its departure from its own previous practice or for its decision to start 
promoting the limitation on the use of one (production purposes) but not the 
other (disease prevention).140 
The stated purpose of the VFD is to simplify the process of becoming a VFD 
drug, to facilitate the transition of feed-use antibiotic drugs from over-the-counter 
to VFD status, and to make the VFD process less burdensome to navigate.141  In 
reality, however, if the FDA can convince all drug sponsors to comply, the VFD 
is in fact a back-door means for the agency to ban the use of antibiotics for growth 
promotion purposes without having to go through the process of promulgating a 
final rule to that effect. 
In addition, the implementation of the VFD may not prove to be as simple a 
process to reduce antibiotic use as it purports to be, because the FDA’s approach 
has several limitations.  First, it requires numerous layers of complex and sustained 
voluntary action from drug sponsors beyond just the initial written agreement 
  
135. Beth Hoffman, New FDA ‘Rules’ Not Likely to Reduce Antibiotic Use on Farm, FORBES (Dec. 13, 
2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bethhoffman/2013/12/13/new-fda-rules-will-
not-reduce-antibiotic-use-on-farm [https://perma.cc/NR4M-JPWD]. 
136. Richard Coulter & Larry L. Miller, The Future of Stafac® (Virginiamycin) for Veterinary Use-
Company Statement, PHIBRO ANIMAL HEALTH CORP. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://phibropro.com/ 
downloads/GN13002USA0413-%20GFI%20209%20and%20213%20PAH%20Public 
%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QGY-3B4B]. 
137. Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 337–43. 
138. Id. at 338–39. 
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they have already given.142  It also requires all drug sponsors to remain in compli-
ance throughout the entire process in order to be effective.  In other words, the 
plan relies on all of the (profit-maximizing, self-interested) entities not to change 
their minds partway through the process and decide to capitalize on the new 
market opportunity left open by all of the other drug sponsors exiting the market 
for antibiotics used for production purposes.143  The FDA has no consequence or 
strategy in place if drug sponsors drop out along the way and render the plan 
impotent.144  Between the disease prevention loophole and the faulty reliance on 
voluntary industry action, the end result of the FDA plan is that what may at first 
seem to be the FDA attempting to find a clever alternative to limit antibiotic 
use—one that bypasses time- and resource-consuming formal processes—could, 
upon closer inspection, make no appreciable difference.  In addition, because the 
FDA does not require data collection on the use of antibiotics in food-producing 
animals, it will not even be possible to track the effect of the agency’s plan on the 
use of these types of antibiotics or on the prevalence of antibiotic resistance in 
humans. 
2. Executive and Congressional (In)Action 
In September 2014, the White House released an Executive Order and a 
National Strategy for combating antibiotic-resistant bacteria.145  The Executive 
Order mandates that the FDA “continue taking steps to eliminate the use of 
medically important classes of antibiotics for growth promotion purposes in 
food-producing animals.”146  Similarly, the accompanying National Strategy aims 
to end the use of medically important antibiotics for growth promotion in food-
producing animals and to bring antibiotic use for disease prevention under veter-
inary oversight.147  In other words, it is essentially a recapitulation of the FDA 
voluntary guidance and VFD; not surprisingly, it promotes implementation of 
the FDA voluntary guidance to achieve these aims, and advocates for enhanced 
  
142. Heinzerling, supra note 131, at 333–37. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Exec. Order No. 13,676: Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 184 Fed. Reg. 56,931, 56,933 
(Sept. 18, 2014); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC-
RESISTANT BACTERIA (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/carb_ 
national_strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/NSD8-U3CQ]. 
146. Exec. Order No. 13,676: Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931, 56,933 
(Sept. 18, 2004). 
147. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 145. 
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data collection to track the problem, educational outreach, and raising public 
awareness.148 
Congressional action in the area of antibiotics has been even less impactful 
than executive action.  The Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act 
(PAMTA) and its Senate companion bill, the Preventing Antibiotics Resistance 
Act (PARA), could have a significant effect on reducing problematic antibiotic 
use if passed.  These bills would require the FDA to withdraw approvals of non-
therapeutic uses of medically important antibiotics in food animals, except where 
a company holding an approval demonstrates with reasonable certainty that the 
nontherapeutic use of the drug will not harm human health by promoting the 
development of antibiotic resistance.149  The bills specifically list routine disease 
prevention as a nontherapeutic use.150  PAMTA, however, has languished in 
Congress for sixteen years since its initial introduction in 1999.151  PARA has 
similarly made no progress since it was first introduced in 2013.152 
The federal government, including the FDA, would unquestionably be the 
strongest actor to promulgate antibiotic regulation.  Despite increasing pressure 
from elected officials, experts, and advocates to take stronger action in this area,153 
federal reform on the issue has proven elusive.  There is a patchwork of federal 
activity on the matter across all three branches of government, but no compre-
hensive federal scheme.  Although the FDA has attempted to set up a mecha-
nism binding industry to its voluntary commitments, the agency ultimately relies 
on the charity of corporate drug sponsors for the success of its plan, and even so, 
leaves a big disease prevention loophole—a loophole large enough to render the 
entire effort meaningless. 
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Despite having articulated over forty years ago the need to eliminate low-
dose antibiotic use in food-producing animals, the federal government still has 
not implemented a coherent, robust legal scheme to achieve it.  Understanding 
this history helps explain why routine subtherapeutic antibiotic use in food-
producing animals continues to grow.  Although the federal government has the 
power to effect meaningful and sweeping change, thus far the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches have declined to do so. 
B. State Action and the California Antibiotics Law 
In the absence of effective federal action, some states have attempted to enact 
their own laws and policies curbing antibiotic use in food-producing animals.154  
To date, all of the proposed state bills except one have been voted down or have 
languished in state legislatures.155  In October 2015, California became the first 
and only state to enact a law that will prohibit the routine use of antibiotics in 
food-producing animals.156  When SB-27 goes into effect in January 2018, the 
law will prohibit the use of antibiotics both for production purposes as well as for 
routine disease prevention, closing the significant loophole left open by the FDA 
voluntary scheme.157  Administering antibiotic drugs to food-producing animals 
will only be permissible when ordered by a licensed veterinarian through a prescrip-
tion or VFD, in the context of a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship.158  
The use of antibiotic drugs will only be permissible to treat disease, to control the 
spread of disease, in connection with a surgery or medical procedure, or for 
prophylaxis in the event of an elevated risk of a particular disease.159  Antibiotics 
  
154. These states include, for example, California, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Minnesota, and 
West Virginia, which have each proposed legislation multiple times to regulate or prohibit routine 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals.  See A.B. 1437, 2013–14 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 835, 2014 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2014); Agriculture-
Commercial Feed and Drinking Water-Antimicrobial Drug Prohibition, S.B. 520 (Md. 2013); 
An Act Prohibiting the Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Drugs for Food Animals and the 
Sale of Food Produced from Animals Administered Antimicrobial Drugs for Nontherapeutic 
Uses, H.F. 1290 (Minn. 2013–14); S.F. 1285, 88th Leg. (Minn. 2013); S.F. 1638, 88th Leg. 
(Minn. 2013); An Act in Relation to Nontherapeutic Use of Antimicrobial Agents in Animals, S. 
201, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015–2016); A.B. 769, 236th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); S.B. 233, 2013–14 
Gen. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); Safe Foods and Families Act, S.B. 740 (Pa. 2015); H.B. 1195, 2013 Gen. 
Assemb. (Pa. 2013); S.B. 531, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2013); H.B. 2112, 2013 Leg. (W. Va. 
2013). 
155. N.Y. S. 201; Pa. S.B. 740; Minn. H.F. 1290; Md. S.B. 520. 
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will not be permitted for growth promotion or feed efficiency, nor may they be 
administered routinely for any purpose.160  
Although the law allows for limited antibiotic use for disease prevention, the 
legislative history of SB-27 suggests it will be enforced so as not to allow routine 
disease prevention.  The previous year, California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed 
another bill that would have codified FDA voluntary guidelines, stating in his veto 
message that he did so because the bill merely duplicated FDA guidance, leaving 
open the disease prevention loophole and not going far enough to reduce antibi-
otic use.161  The fact that Governor Brown signed the 2015 bill into law indicates 
that it is crafted deliberately to go beyond FDA voluntary guidelines and regulates 
antibiotic use more strictly than does the federal scheme. 
IV. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND CURRENT ANTIBIOTICS 
REGIMES 
As discussed in Part II, democratic experimentalism offers a key theoretical 
lens for regulating in the antibiotics context for several reasons.  This approach 
accounts for the scientific nature of antibiotic resistance and the problem’s critical 
threat to public health.  At the same time, it mandates structured, disciplined action 
while still flexibly accounting for local circumstances.  This Part situates the cur-
rent antibiotics regime, consisting of a state law and somewhat nebulous federal 
administrative agency action, within the democratic experimentalist framework, 
delineating how democratic experimentalist theory applies (and does not apply) 
to current antibiotics regulation and offering prescriptive suggestions for how the 
theoretical framework should apply in this context going forward.  It argues that a 
new iteration of democratic experimentalism emerges, called layered democratic 
experimentalism, which offers great promise as a hybrid public-private mechanism 
for problem-solving.  This Part concludes by describing challenges in applying 
democratic experimentalism to this problem, related primarily to concerns about 
equity and the lack of national uniformity. 
A. The Emergence of Layered Democratic Experimentalism 
In its simplest terms, democratic experimentalism consists of (1) centralized 
goal-setting; (2) delegation of experimentation to achieve that goal to subnational 
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jurisdictions; (3) centralized data collection on local performance; and (4) cen-
tralized assessment of local performance and revising of initial benchmarks as 
necessary.162 
The first step in democratic experimentalist inquiry is a central institution 
identifying and expressly stating a common goal.  In this case, centralized 
goal-setting has surely occurred.  At the federal level, the FDA has identified a 
common goal in its voluntary Guidance for Industry documents: reducing antibi-
otic resistance in humans by reducing or eliminating subtherapeutic antibiotic use 
in livestock.163  In addition to the FDA, the White House has issued the National 
Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.164  One of the purposes 
of this plan is to “guide action by public health, healthcare, and veterinary partners 
in a common effort to address urgent and serious drug-resistant threats that affect 
people in the U.S. and around the world.”165  In addition, the Action Plan an-
nounced that “[p]rogress towards achieving these outcomes will be monitored by 
the U.S. Government Task Force that developed [the plan].”166  At the federal 
level, then, both the FDA and the White House have articulated the common 
goal of reducing antibiotic resistance in humans by reducing the subtherapeutic 
use of antibiotics in food-producing animals. 
The state of California has announced its desire to achieve this federal goal in 
enacting SB-27.167  The law was passed for the express purpose of “address[ing] 
an urgent public health problem” posed by overuse of antibiotics, and to reduce 
antibiotic resistance in humans by reducing the use of antibiotics in livestock.168  
Indeed, during the first Senate hearing on SB-27, Senator Hill, the bill’s author, 
articulated the bill’s goal by alluding to the growing public health threat posed by 
the overuse and misuse of agricultural antibiotics.169  In enacting this law, Cali-
fornia has taken steps in pursuit of the federal government’s articulated goal, 
  
162. Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 54–55, 78–79; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 84, at 316–17. 
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(Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_27_Signing_Message.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
D5L7-A7UQ]. 
169. SENATOR HILL, HEARING REPORT OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, 
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resembling the beginnings of a democratic experimentalist relationship between 
state and federal government. 
The resemblance of SB-27 to traditionally conceived democratic experimen-
talism begins to break down at this point, in that there is not a federal delegation to 
states to experiment locally in pursuit of achieving this goal.  The California law 
was not enacted in response to a federal delegation of authority; in fact, it may 
even fly in the face of federal authority if it is found to be preempted.  Despite the 
fact that this regime is not a neat example of democratic experimentalism, however, 
the theoretical framework does or can still apply, albeit in a more layered manner. 
At first glance the California law may seem to resemble a traditional 
command-and-control piece of legislation.  It operates as a ban on a certain set 
of practices.  But it also has elements of democratic experimentalism and the 
potential for a democratic experimentalist implementation.  The law calls for 
improved data collection in order to better understand the scientific problem at 
hand and to monitor livestock management in implementation of this law, and it 
plans to do both in continuous coordination with the relevant federal agencies 
and departments.170  But the law leaves significant leeway in implementing its data 
collection requirements.171  It is thus at a pivotal point: Its implementation is 
both critical and up for determination.  If the law is implemented in a traditional 
command-and-control manner with little meaningful data collection, the 
democratic experimentalist framework would have little application and thus 
little effect as a theoretical framework.  Alternatively, if the law is implemented 
with strategic and robust data collection requirements, California will emerge as 
a central coordinator, collecting and comparing data and possibly even serving 
as a curator of best practices among California firms.  This implementation 
would underscore the law’s engagement in an implicit delegation of authority to 
experiment to local firms.  Perhaps even more compelling, if other states follow 
suit with their own laws regulating antibiotics and mandating data collection, the 
various states’ experiences and the effects of their different legislations could be 
compared and best legislative practices discerned.  This process would resemble a 
true democratic experimentalist approach among participating states. 
What would then emerge is a layered public-private democratic experi-
mentalism in which the federal government identifies a goal, state governments 
enact an initial benchmark and serve as data collectors and poolers, and local 
firms receive delegated authority to experiment to achieve the overarching goal.  
This approach does not represent traditional democratic experimentalism, but it 
  
170. S.B. 27. 
171. Id. 
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is a powerful iteration.  Experimentation in best practices at both the firm level 
(how to efficiently raise livestock without the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics) 
and the state level (which legislative practices result in the greatest reduction of 
agricultural use of antibiotics) is where real change and meaningful breakthroughs 
can occur.172   
It may seem at first glance as though a ban is the only legislative option to 
eliminate problematic antibiotic use and that therefore this policy issue is not ripe 
for democratic experimentalism.  It may also seem that a ban is a straightforward 
piece of command-and-control legislation with no democratic experimentalist 
characteristics.  A brief example from the European Union illustrates why both of 
these suppositions are incorrect.  The European Union banned antibiotics as 
growth promoters in 2006.173  Because all member states must comply with the 
same blanket ban, the expectation is that the same or similar results would accrue 
in each country.  This was not the case.  Some countries’ use of antibiotics has 
increased since the ban, others have remained constant, and still others have 
decreased.  Since 2011, eleven European countries have decreased antibiotic use 
in livestock while six have increased.174  In the Netherlands, for example, antibi-
otic use remained constant even as subtherapeutic use dropped, with producers 
simply increasing their therapeutic use of antibiotics to compensate for the ban 
on subtherapeutic use.175  In response to these unsatisfactory results from EU-
level regulation, in 2007 the Netherlands implemented its own supplementary 
measures alongside the ban, including increased on-farm transparency; requiring 
veterinary registration of prescribed antibiotics; creating an independent institute 
to monitor antibiotic use, report it publicly, and set benchmarks; and requiring 
custom treatment plans for each farm, among other measures.176  The Netherlands 
implemented these measures in large part based on the successful Danish 
  
172. Tom Philpott, How Factory Farms Play Chicken With Antibiotics, MOTHER JONES (May/June 
2016) http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2016/05/perdue-antibiotic-free-chicken-meat-
resistance [https://perma.cc/ALM8-RM4M]. 
173. Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 on Additives for Use in Animal Nutrition, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 29. 
174. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AMR: A MAJOR EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL CHALLENGE, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_food-safety/docs/amr_factsheet_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA3J-
E4WL]. 
175. Carol Cogliani et al., Restricting Antimicrobial Use in Food Animals: Lessons From Europe, 6 
MICROBE 274, 277 (2011), http://emerald.tufts.edu/med/apua/research/pew_12_846139138.pdf. 
176. Dik Mevius & Dick Heederik, Reduction of Antibiotic Use in Animals “Let’s Go Dutch”, 9 J. 
VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ & LEBENSMITTELICHERHEIT 177. 179 (2014), http://link. 
springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00003-014-0874-z. 
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approach.177  As a result of these measures, the Netherlands reduced antibiotic 
use by 56 percent over five years, meeting its target reduction one year early.178  
This example illustrates how the other practices that a state legislates alongside a 
blanket ban can be critical and the importance of comparing to another entity’s 
experience.  Simply banning certain uses may not have the intended results and 
can still leave room for critical experimentation and comparison, illustrating how 
democratic experimentalism can provide a solution in this policy area. 
Delegating this authority to states and even to firms, even implicitly as the 
California law has done, represents a critical approach to problem-solving in this 
area.  If there is robust data collection in place to track experiences at the firm- and 
state-levels, best practices can be identified and then enshrined legislatively, and 
benchmarks set and re-set once met.  This iterative process can continue until the 
problem is solved.  Data collection is therefore a crucial step for the success of 
democratic experimentalism.  Without robust data collection, experiences cannot 
be assessed and compared and benchmarks cannot be met. 
California’s success in this area could inspire other states to begin legislat-
ing around antibiotics as well, or at least mandating data collection.179  This trend 
would come to resemble a bottom-up democratic experimentalist movement 
amongst states.  What started as a non-traditional layered democratic experimen-
talist approach would in fact come to represent a participant-involved demo-
cratic movement, supporting and reinforcing the basic ethos behind democratic 
experimentalism.  Layered democratic experimentalism thus offers great promise 
as a hybrid public-private mechanism for effective problem-solving. 
B. Challenges in Applying Democratic Experimentalism 
A lack of national uniformity is inherent in the democratic experimentalist 
model: In order to experiment, there must be variation among subnational 
jurisdictions.  When considering whether to apply the democratic experimentalist 
framework to a policy problem, the value of democratic experimentation must 
always be weighed against the value of a single national regime.  For companies 
whose operations span across California and another state, the current antibiotics 
regime will require compliance with two sets of laws.  Operators in California also 
  
177. Dik Mevius & Dick Heederi, Reduction of Antibiotic Use in Animals: “Let’s Go Dutch”, 9 J. für 
Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit, 177 (2014), http://link.springer.com/article/ 
10.1007%2Fs00003-014-0874-z. 
178. Id at 180. 
179. Over the last several years, concurrent with California’s legislative process, a handful of other states 
have proposed legislation to address overuse of antibiotics in food-producing animals.  Thus far 
none of the proposals has passed.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 154. 
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face the cost disadvantage of having to produce their products without the use of 
subtherapeutic antibiotics while competing with producers in other states who will 
still be able to administer antibiotics in this way.  If other states follow suit with 
their own antibiotics laws or use restrictions that vary from the federal government 
and from California, a more complicated patchwork of compliance may develop.  
In this case, then, the uniformity concern requires weighing the effects of 
experimentation to solve a pressing and little understood threat to public health 
and safety, against the cost to businesses and consumers of a non-uniform regime. 
In order to conduct that balance, it is important to estimate as best as possible 
the actual financial costs of eliminating the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in 
livestock.  Doing so also sheds light on another concern associated with eliminat-
ing the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics: the inequitable effects on the poor of 
raising the price of meat.  Evidence from Denmark, where the practice has been 
banned for over a decade, suggests that the effect on the cost of raising pork has 
been minimal.180  In addition, Perdue, a leading chicken producer in the United 
States that has voluntarily begun phasing out the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics 
in two-thirds of its chickens, has indicated that the cost of doing so has not been 
significant, though it recoups the costs by passing them on to consumers in the 
form of a 20 percent price premium.181  This passing on to consumers raises pre-
cisely the fears about inequity that may be associated with the ban on subthera-
peutic antibiotics. 
It is, however, important to remember the alternative.  At present, an in-
creasing number of companies and retailers are committing to eliminating the 
use of antibiotics in their products.182  This trend leaves the poor with the unat-
tractive option of consuming antibiotics-treated meat and increased exposure to 
antibiotic-resistant pathogens in their meat, while wealthier consumers can 
afford antibiotics-free meat and avoid exposure to these pathogens.  In contrast, 
if firms were required to experiment in the elimination of subtherapeutic antibi-
otics and centralized institutions pooled data on their performance, the best prac-
tices for efficiently and cost-effectively doing so would begin to emerge, ultimately 
resulting in the least cost increases possible.  In addition, the market price of meat 
currently does not reflect the actual cost of meat because, among other reasons, 
the current price does not account for the externality of breeding antibiotic-
resistant pathogens in meat production.  The current price of meat is the product 
of a shortcut that the industry has been taking for decades—a shortcut that is no 
  
180. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 74, at 3. 
181. Philpott, supra note 172. 
182. See e.g., Hackett, supra note 77; Strom, supra note 77. 
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longer acceptable for public health.  Legally eliminating subtherapeutic antibi-
otic use will require companies to innovate swiftly to produce meat cost-
effectively in a way that does not seriously threaten public health.  If companies 
choose to pass on any cost increases to consumers, rather than internalize the 
costs themselves, it will result in consumers paying the actual cost of meat and 
not an artificially deflated cost.  It will also result in healthier meat and healthier 
production systems for all—not just for the wealthy.   
Finally, because many major retailers are requiring suppliers to phase out 
the use of antibiotics in their production over the next decade, the writing is on 
the wall for firms.  Enacting a legal framework that calls for democratic experi-
mentalism will best support these firms in achieving these goals by establishing a 
collaborative, trial-and-error regime that rewards the most efficient problem-
solvers.  Doing so likely represents the most cost-effective mechanism for solving 
this problem.  Similarly, although it is unclear how costly it is to comply with 
multiple sets of laws, it is likely that the streamlined and systematized schematic 
that democratic experimentalism offers would optimize these costs of compliance.  
Firms would certainly experience increased initial costs of compliance, but they 
could also benefit from the experience of other firms, helping them to recoup 
their initial costs.  In addition, states would benefit from the legislative experiences 
of other states, and best practices would emerge on how to legislate most effectively 
to reduce antibiotic use. 
V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM 
State legislation prohibiting the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in farm 
animal production is a strong potential strategy for reducing the spread of antibi-
otic resistance.  States are not free to regulate in every area, however, and state 
action in certain areas may be subject to constitutional challenge on preemption 
grounds.  Federal preemption occurs when a federal law conflicts with a state law, 
whether directly or indirectly, rendering the state law void.183  Federal preemp-
tion doctrine has its basis in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
which grants Congress the power to preempt state law when it legislates within 
the powers afforded to it under the Constitution.184  As a result, where a state law 
comes into conflict with a valid federal law, federal law prevails.185 
  
183. See e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
184. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
185. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153. 
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Because states are independent sovereigns in our federal system, courts 
presume that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law.”186  A finding of 
preemption is “not favored ‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that 
the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or that the 
Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’”187  Fields traditionally occupied by the 
states are especially shielded from preemption, as courts “start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”188  In 
particular, the U.S. Supreme Court has presumed that federal law does not 
invalidate state laws pertaining to health and safety.189  This presumption is par-
ticularly important in the context of a state law regulating the use of antibiotic 
drugs in food-producing animals for the purpose of protecting the health and 
safety of its citizens.190  This Part begins with a brief analysis of preemption 
doctrine as applied to SB-27, concluding that although a court should not find 
the California law to be preempted, one could ultimately find either way on this 
unsettled question of law.  It then proceeds with an argument for democratic 
experimentalist–informed preemption doctrine to apply in specific contexts such 
as this one where the policy area at issue is knowledge-intensive and marked by 
scientific uncertainty. 
A. Brief Overview of Preemption 
1. Express Preemption 
There are two broad types of preemption: express and implied.191  Express 
preemption occurs when Congress declares in the text of a statute its intent 
to preempt state law.192  If the state law at issue is found to fall within the scope 
of the statute’s preemption clause, the state law is preempted.193  In this case, the 
relevant federal statute is the FDCA.  Congress passed this Act in 1938, expanding 
  
186. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
187. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981) (quoting Chicago & Nw. 
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)). 
188. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). 
189. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985). 
190. See A.B. 49, 2014–2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (“The spread of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria poses a risk to the health of Californians and reduced use of antibiotics for livestock 
production is likely to reduce the risks of the rise and spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria through 
food and other pathways, thus reducing the risk to Californians.”). 
191. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
192. See, e.g., id. 
193. See, e.g., id. 
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the federal government’s role in ensuring the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics, 
and creating the FDA.194  The FDCA delegates to the FDA the statutory au-
thority to “protect the public health by ensuring that . . . human and veterinary 
drugs are safe and effective.”195  Of particular relevance, Congress gave the 
FDA the authority to approve the use and labeling of any “new animal drug.”196  
However, the statute does not contain express preemption language regarding 
the regulation of antibiotic drugs in food-producing animals, so express preemp-
tion does not apply.197  In a recent case involving a question of federal preemption, 
Association des Éleveurs de Canards et D’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California considered whether a California 
statute banning force feeding to produce foie gras was expressly preempted by 
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), the federal statute that regulates the dis-
tribution and sale of poultry products.198  PPIA contains a broadly sweeping 
preemption clause that expressly prohibits states from imposing “[m]arking, 
labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different 
than” those required by PPIA.199  The court found that the statute was preempted 
because it imposed ingredient requirements—namely, force feeding require-
ments—for the sale of foie gras in California that were not required by the federal 
statute.200  Although the court interpreted the meaning of “ingredient require-
ment” broadly in that case to include force feeding birds to produce foie gras, the 
same cannot be said for administering subtherapeutic antibiotics to animals.  
Unlike force feeding birds, which creates the type of fatty liver requisite for 
producing foie gras, administering subtherapeutic antibiotics to animals is not a 
necessary ingredient for creating any specific type of food.  Therefore SB-27 
does not trigger the PPIA preemption provision and is distinguishable from 
Association des Éleveurs. 
  
194. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012). 
195. 21 U.S.C. §§ 393(b)(2) (2012). 
196. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1) (2012). 
197. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 538 (1977) (stating that the FDCA “contains no pre-
emptive language”). 
198. Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1139 (C.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
199. 21 U.S.C. § 467e (2012).  The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) regulates the distribution and 
sale of meat products.  It contains a nearly identical preemption clause to PPIA.  21 U.S.C. § 678 
(2012). 
200. Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. 
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2. Implied Preemption 
In the absence of an express preemption clause, a court may still invalidate a 
state law under implied preemption.  Within implied preemption are two catego-
ries: field preemption and conflict preemption.   
Field preemption only occurs where Congress has not expressly preempted 
state law, but has legislated to create a federal regulatory scheme that is so perva-
sive as to “occupy the field” in that area of the law and warrant the inference that 
Congress did not intend the states to supplement it.201  The Supreme Court has 
reserved findings of field preemption for cases involving comprehensive federal 
legal regimes, such as national labor law, where the intent of Congress was un-
mistakably to create a uniform national system.202  The relevant question is 
whether the FDCA, in combination with the FDA antibiotics scheme, can be 
considered a pervasive federal regulatory regime akin to national labor legislation.  
After forty years of silent indecision vis-à-vis antibiotics in food-producing animals, 
the FDA chose to pursue an informal voluntary route consisting of two voluntary 
guidance documents and a final rule, in large part to avoid the complexity and cost 
of the formal process.  The FDA’s choice to avoid formal processes weighs 
strongly against finding the existence of a comprehensive federal regulatory 
scheme occupying the entire field.  In light of the current patchwork of voluntary 
and piecemeal federal action, it seems implausible that a court could conclude 
that a comprehensive federal regime exists to overcome the presumption for 
states to legislate to protect public health and safety, such that the unequivocal 
congressional intent was to prohibit supplementary state law regulating the dan-
gerous overuse of antibiotics.203 
  
201. Fidelity Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982). 
202. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959). 
203. It is important to note that one district court case from 1986 has touched on the issue of field 
preemption and antibiotics.  In Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corporation, 
a nonprofit organization brought an action to compel a veal company to disclose information on its 
label regarding its production practices in raising veal.  Animal Legal Def. Fund Bos., Inc. v. 
Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 278 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 802 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986).  
The court held that the claims were preempted by the “comprehensive federal scheme” in the 
labeling, packaging, and marketing of meat and use of medicated animal feeds.  Id.  There are 
several critical distinctions between Provimi and SB-27.  Provimi was a deceptive practices action 
primarily concerned with animal welfare and meat labeling.  It attempted to compel corporate 
speech and require a certain label be affixed to certain meat.  In contrast, SB-27 is a state law 
primarily concerned with protecting the health and safety of consumers from the dangerous 
overuse of antibiotics, a danger bolstered by mounting scientific evidence.  SB-27 does not compel 
speech or concern labeling, packaging, or marketing meat.  While Provimi implicated FDCA, 
FMIA, and PPIA, prompting the court to find a comprehensive regulatory regime was in place, 
SB-27 only implicates the FDCA and the FDA voluntary scheme regarding antibiotics.  These 
cannot reasonably be considered a comprehensive federal regulatory regime.  The holding in 
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Conflict preemption further breaks down into two types.  The first type, 
known as “physical impossibility,” occurs when it is impossible to comply with 
both the federal and state statutes at once.204  Physical impossibility cases are rela-
tively clear-cut.  The Supreme Court interprets physical impossibility preemption 
narrowly, reserving its application of the doctrine for cases where federal law and 
state law are entirely irreconcilable—for instance, where “state law penalizes what 
federal law requires.”205  Here, compliance with the state law prohibiting the sub-
therapeutic use of antibiotic drugs in food-producing animals would not make it 
operationally impossible to comply with federal law.  The FDCA provides a pro-
cess for approving animal drugs and medicated feed, but it does not require the 
use of any such drugs.  In fact, complying with the California law will actually en-
sure that producers are in compliance with FDA’s voluntary guidance and are 
furthering the FDA objective of judicious use of antibiotics.206  Physical impossi-
bility conflict preemption thus does not apply. 
The second type of conflict preemption, known as “obstacle,” occurs when 
state law represents an obstacle to fully achieving the purposes or objectives of 
Congress.207  Obstacle preemption is much less clear-cut than physical impossi-
bility preemption; perhaps unsurprisingly, courts more easily invoke this type of 
preemption than any of the others.208  With respect to obstacle preemption, “the 
presumption against preemption of state laws dictates that a law must do ‘major 
damage’ to clear and substantial federal interests before the Supremacy Clause 
will demand that state law surrenders to federal regulation.”209  There is no doubt 
that the California law is stricter than the FDA’s scheme.  Indeed, Governor 
Brown’s veto message suggests that it was the California law’s explicit intent to 
go beyond the FDA’s guidelines.  From an implied preemption perspective, the 
relevant question is whether the California law impermissibly conflicts with—
indeed, does major damage to—the purposes and objectives of the FDCA such 
  
Provimi preempted a state law deceptive practices claim, whereas a similar finding in this case 
would invalidate a state law, something courts do not do lightly.  It is implausible that the reasoning 
in Provimi could credibly be used to justify invalidating the California law under field preemption. 
204. See, e.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Fla. Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)). 
205. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
206. See FDA, supra note 120, at 3; Veterinary Feed Directive, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,708, 31,708 (June 3, 
2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 514, 558). 
207. Geier, 529 U.S. at 899 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
208. Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE 
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 132 (William W. Buzbee 
ed., 2009). 
209. Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Indiana, 736 F.3d 1041, 1050 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hillman v. 
Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013)). 
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that the state law is preempted when it regulates antibiotics that have been 
approved by the FDA and exceeds the FDA voluntary guidelines and VFD. 
This analysis first requires assessing Congress’s purposes and objectives 
under the FDCA.  The creation of the FDCA expanded the federal role in drug 
regulation, particularly by creating the FDA and delegating to the agency the 
premarket drug approval process.210  Even as Congress amended the FDCA over 
the years to enlarge the FDA’s powers, it “took care to preserve state law,” includ-
ing adding a clause in 1962 “that a provision of state law would only be invalidated 
upon a ‘direct and positive conflict’ with the FDCA.”211  Congress has added 
several express preemption clauses to the FDCA, including regarding medical 
device regulation,212 cosmetic labeling and packaging,213 and nutrition labeling 
(via the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act).214  These express preemption 
clauses suggest that when Congress has desired to preclude supplementary state 
law on a subject governed by the FDCA, it has done so explicitly and via a 
detailed, narrowly tailored express preemption provision.215  Though Congress 
delegated authority to regulate antibiotics to the FDA, it has consistently and 
explicitly disclaimed intent to impliedly preempt state law in this area.216  Case 
law supports this proposition: When Congress has not spoken directly on the 
preemption issue and a state has imposed a stricter standard that does not make 
compliance with federal law impossible, courts generally assume that federal 
regulations have set a floor over which states may impose further requirements.217 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the FDA’s premarket drug approval 
process is insufficient to show that Congress viewed state laws imposing stricter 
  
210. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009). 
211. Id.; see also Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 793, 241 (1962). 
212. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012). 
213. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 379s (2012). 
214. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012)). 
215. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (citing the FDCA’s express preemption provision 
for medical devices as evidence that Congress did not intend to impliedly preempt state tort claims 
involving prescription drugs); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 547 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The existence of an express pre-emption provision 
tends to contradict any inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the statute’s 
express language defines.”); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612–14 (1991) (holding 
that plaintiff’s state law claim was not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act because the Act’s express preemption provision “would be pure surplusage if 
Congress had intended to occupy the entire field of pesticide regulation”). 
216. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567; Wis. Pub. Intervenor, 501 U.S. at 612–14; Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547. 
217. See Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York, 832 F. Supp. 2d 310, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 716 
F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 
1106 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Federal law is not a floor or a ceiling such [that] any state law varying 
from what federal law permits is preempted.”). 
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standards on FDA-approved drugs as an obstacle to its purposes and objectives 
under the FDCA, especially in light of all the evidence that Congress did not 
desire for the FDCA to impliedly preempt state law.218  The FDA’s approval of 
the general use of a certain drug does not limit states’ abilities to restrict the drug’s 
use in dangerous contexts, according to the Supreme Court in Wyeth v. Levine.  
The approval of an antibiotic drug for use in food-producing animals does not 
equate to a requirement or even a desire that the antibiotic drug be allowed for use 
in every context.219 
The statute itself declares that its purpose is to ensure the safety and effec-
tiveness of veterinary drugs.220  State law that intentionally exceeds the FDA 
scheme could arguably be seen as an impermissible obstacle to these congressional 
purposes.  However, the FDA states in its response to commentary to the final 
rule that VFD drugs should only be used for disease prevention purposes where 
“appropriate for the treatment, control, or prevention of a specific disease,”221 
which counsels against the use of routinized, low doses administered herd- or 
flock-wide.  The state regulation in this case seeks to achieve the same objective 
as the federal government: the judicious use of antibiotics in food-producing 
animals, particularly vis-à-vis routine use for disease prevention.  The state is 
stepping in here to fill a gap in the absence of binding federal action and in the 
face of federal acknowledgment of the problem but political gridlock on how to 
act.  Far from thwarting congressional federal objectives, the California law argua-
bly furthers them by limiting antibiotic use in a way that reflects over forty years of 
FDA understanding and that is in line with the principle set forth in the VFD. 
It is also unlikely that the FDA antibiotics scheme qualifies as an agency 
action that can sufficiently preempt state law.  “[A]n agency regulation with the 
force of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements,”222 but “[c]ourts with 
good reason are wary of affording preemptive force to actions taken under more 
informal circumstances.”223  There is some authority for the proposition that only 
exercises of an agency’s formal rulemaking authority are sufficient to preempt 
  
218. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575.  It should also be noted that it is unlikely this type of state law runs the 
risk of creating a patchwork of state laws.  There simply are not many options for variation in the 
laws around subtherapeutic antibiotic use.  The California law uncontroversially reflects forty years 
of FDA practice and understanding about subtherapeutic antibiotic use.  It is likely any other state 
legislating in this area would adopt a similar or identical approach.  If not, that state would run the 
risk of thwarting federal objectives. 
219. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n, 33 F. Supp. at 1106 (“Not banning some activity is not the same 
as affirmatively requiring that it be allowed.”). 
220. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(1)-(2) (2012). 
221. Id. 
222. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576. 
223. Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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state law.224  Although there are exceptions to requiring formal notice and com-
ment rulemaking,225 nonbinding guidance is insufficient to preempt state law.226  
Even if formal rulemaking is not a strict threshold to preemptive power, it is 
unlikely that the FDA antibiotics scheme—two voluntary guidance documents 
coupled with one final rule—would be given preemptive weight.  Although the 
FDA scheme should not be dismissed outright because it is not purely informal 
and does implicate a final rule, the scheme is a sort of hybrid with murky contours.  
Given the case law on point and the relatively high standard it sets for assigning 
preemptive effect to agency action, it seems unlikely this scheme would be 
considered sufficient to preempt state law. 
On the other hand, the California law explicitly and deliberately exceeds the 
federal scheme established by the FDA.  Normative reasoning aside, in drafting 
SB-27, the California legislature set out to exceed the federal scheme, as indicated 
by Governor Jerry Brown in his veto of the previous bill that replicated the FDA 
voluntary guidance.  Intentionally exceeding the federal scheme could be viewed 
by a court as presenting an obstacle to the federal purposes and objectives of 
Congress.  The FDA has considered this issue for over forty years, it has approved 
the use of these antibiotic drugs in livestock, and it has decided to pursue a 
voluntary scheme that does not prohibit the use of antibiotics for disease pre-
vention purposes.  Read this way, the California law stands in conflict with a 
federal scheme, which, although unsatisfactory, is relatively clear in its allowance 
of antibiotic drugs in livestock for these purposes. 
In short, although the above preemption analysis suggests that the California 
law should prevail if challenged, a court could plausibly decide either way on the 
issue.  A court could reasonably find that the law survives such a challenge because 
  
224. See Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 51 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’d and remanded, 555 U.S. 70 
(2008) (“Unlike many other exercises of agency authority, formal rulemaking comes with a host of 
procedural protections under the Administrative Procedure Act (‘APA’), such as notice of the 
proposed rule, an opportunity for interested parties to participate, a statement of the basis and 
purpose of any rule adopted, and its publication in the Federal Register.  5 U.S.C. § 533 (2007).  
Limiting the preemptive power of federal agencies to exercises of formal rulemaking authority, 
then, ensures that the states will have enjoyed these protections before suffering the displacement of 
their laws.”). 
225. See Fellner, 539 F.3d at 244 (noting that “in appropriate circumstances, federal agency action taken 
pursuant to statutorily granted authority short of formal, notice and comment rulemaking may also 
have preemptive effect over state law” (citing Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 271 (3d Cir. 
2008))). 
226. See Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 340–41 (3rd Cir. 2009) (FDA’s informal policy 
statements on the use of the word “natural,” as well as several warning letters in which the FDA 
told a manufacturer to remove the term “natural” from a product’s label, did not give FDA’s policy 
the weight of law necessary to preempt state law); Von Koenig v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. 
Supp. 2d 1066, 1074–76 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (following Holk, 575 F.3d 329). 
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it furthers federal objectives in a number of ways and is supported by California’s 
compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.  Equally, a 
court could find that the law does not survive a preemption challenge because it 
deliberately exceeds the federal scheme established by the FDA after forty years 
of consideration.  This analysis highlights how the law in this area is unsettled; 
states such as California that legislate beyond federal standards run the risk of 
courts invalidating their legislation on preemption grounds.  This risk of invalida-
tion underscores the threat preemption poses to the valuable problem-solving 
processes of experimentation and the fruits of data collection and pooling.  The 
only legislation in the country that currently meaningfully addresses this critical 
issue is at risk of being invalidated: Preemption in this context could have dele-
terious effects on solving the antibiotic resistance crisis. 
B. Democratic Experimentalist-Informed Preemption Doctrine 
Rather than limiting or threatening democratic experimentalism, in certain 
contexts such as this one preemption doctrine should encourage its valuable 
problem-solving processes.  As Justices Brandeis and O’Connor have both noted, 
“[o]ne of federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by 
allowing for the possibility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.’”227  Democratic experimentalist theory 
contends that policy experimentation is central to optimal policy choices in cer-
tain areas.228  This theoretical framework can therefore help promote the virtues 
of federalism, as conceived by Justices Brandeis and O’Connor, by informing 
preemption doctrine and bolstering the argument against federal preemption in 
these certain areas. 
What, then, are these certain areas?  They can be categorized as 
“knowledge-intensive” and scientifically uncertain—where the impediment to 
effective lawmaking is not ignorance of some but uncertainty of all, and significant 
empirical data are needed to identify solutions.  Expertise is insufficient to solve 
problems whose solutions are uncertain and involve unsettled scientific or social 
scientific questions.  In these areas, amassing knowledge via experimentation, data 
pooling, and multi-stage, continuous feedback policymaking is critical to 
problem-solving.229  As a result, these policy areas are unlikely to be resolved by 
  
227. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
228. Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 557 (2015). 
229. See Gubler, supra note 95, at 129–31. 
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command-and-control legislation but are perfect candidates for democratic 
experimentalist legislation.  Knowledge-intensive and scientifically uncertain 
issues may include, for example, antibiotic resistance, pollution, police abuse, 
education, housing, and welfare.230  Where the issue at stake is a public good or 
significantly threatens public health, as in the case of antibiotic resistance, the 
argument is even stronger in favor of the democratic experimentalist approach 
because of the acute need for efficient and swift solutions and the unlikelihood 
that other forms of legislation or private actors will provide them rapidly enough 
of their own accord. 
Other areas that could raise preemption questions can be differentiated 
from knowledge-intensive issues.  For example, one policy area that might raise 
preemption questions can be thought of as “values-based”: Society must make a 
collective judgment about the types of values it wishes to promote and enshrine in 
law.  These policy areas might include gay marriage, civil rights, and abortion.  In 
these cases, allowing for experimentation at the local level would not yield any 
relevant information in terms of how best to legislate to achieve a certain goal and 
so democratic experimentalist-informed preemption doctrine would not apply.  
No amount of data pooling or empirical testing will inform how best to legislate 
in these areas; the legislation ultimately must reflect a collective societal value 
judgment.  If there are benefits to be gained from allowing differing local laws, 
they are not experimental in nature.  In knowledge-intensive policy areas, there is 
an articulated goal to be reached—for example, reducing antibiotic resistance in 
humans, alleviating police abuse, improving education—and the pathway to 
achieving that goal is an unclear scientific or social scientific question.  In values-
based policy areas, there is a collective value judgment to be made and reflected in 
law—for example, whether the state should recognize same-sex marriage, what 
should be considered a protected class under the law, and whether abortion should 
be permissible.  Command-and-control legislation does not have the same 
trouble in these contexts that it does in knowledge-intensive contexts.  The 
democratic experimentalist-informed preemption doctrine is thus narrow in 
scope: It should afford deference to experimental approaches only in knowledge-
intensive policy areas, as defined above, and not sweepingly.  In these 
knowledge-intensive areas, the democratic experimentalist theoretical framework 
bolsters the argument against preemption.  Preemption doctrine should evolve to 
favor democratic experimentalism in these contexts. 
Historical precedent exists for the potential of experimentalist state action to 
effect largescale change to improve the food system and public health.  Legislative 
  
230. See generally Sabel & Simon, supra note 91. 
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action in food law and policy at the state level has helped spur significant 
change not only statewide, but also nationally as other states follow the first 
state or municipality’s example.  Examples of this phenomenon include the trans 
fat ban, menu labeling requirements, states adopting nutrition standards, farm to 
school laws, healthy food financing to incentivize locating grocery stores in cer-
tain areas, and cage-free egg laws.231   To demonstrate the effect state and local 
action can have, take for example the trans fat ban experience.  In 2006, New 
York City’s Board of Health banned trans fat in restaurant food.232  Philadelphia 
followed suit shortly after with its own ban,233 followed by Boston in 2008.234  Also 
in 2008, California became the first state to ban trans fat in restaurants, effective 
January 2010.235  Just five years later, in 2015, the FDA issued a final determina-
tion revoking “generally recognized as safe” (otherwise known as GRAS) status 
for trans fat, finding that there is no safe amounts of trans fat that should be 
consumed.236  By June 2018, all trans fat will be removed from prepared foods in 
the United States.237  In less than ten years, the local and state actions in this area 
led to a national ban, highlighting the impact this type of experimentalist state 
action can have.  It is critical to rethink how democratic experimentalist theory 
should inform federal preemption doctrine in knowledge-intensive and scientif-
ically uncertain contexts so that it encourages, rather than threatens, local experi-
mentation structured by central coordination and monitoring, in order to solve 
pressing policy problems—particularly those that involve threats to public health.  
Bolstering state laws in this way will encourage more frequent engagement in 
layered democratic experimentalist endeavors, with promising potential. 
  
231. See, e.g., Act Relative to School Nutrition of 2010 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
Mass. Gen. Laws); Farm to School Procurement Act of 2012 (as codified in ALA. CODE § 16-1-
46 (2012) and as amended in ALA. CODE § 16-13B-2 (2012)); Healthy Food Retail Act of 2009 
(as codified in LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:296); California Healthy Food Financing Initiative of 2011 (as 
codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 104660–64 (West 2006)); Standards for 
Confining Farm Animals/Prevention of Animal Cruelty Act (as codified in CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–94 (West 2010)). 
232. See DEPT. OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF 
AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.08) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070115114212/http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/pu
blic/notice-adoption-hc-art81-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVC8-U99B]. 
233. Phila., Pa., HEALTH CODE § 6-307 (2015). 
234. See BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N, A REGULATION TO RESTRICT FOODS CONTAINING 
ARTIFICIAL TRANS FAT IN THE CITY OF BOSTON,  http://www.bphc.org/boardofhealth/ 
regulations/Documents/Trans_Fat_Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/S46A-M929]. 
235. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114377 (2009). 
236. Final Determination Regarding Partially Hydrogenated Oils, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,650 (June 17, 2015). 
237. Id. 
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C. Lessons for States 
States are important agents of change in food and health law and policy, 
often advancing the field where the federal government is cumbersome, slow, or 
ineffective.  The experience of the California antibiotics law provides lessons 
for states, as well as other players in state and local policy, that wish to legislate 
effectively to improve food systems and public health.  As the deputy director of 
the Antibiotic Resistance Action Center at George Washington University has 
stated, “this is a very, very good bill.”238  This Part explores best practices for 
states to consider when legislating to improve food systems, both in antibiotics 
and beyond.  This Part addresses both ex ante factors that should be considered 
prior to embarking on drafting the law itself and engagement in a deliberative 
writing process that maximizes the chances of the law being upheld if challenged. 
1. The Ex Ante Process and the Role of Popular Opinion and Scientific 
Evidence 
An important lesson from the California antibiotics law is the value of making 
a deliberative policy choice when considering in which areas to legislate.  One 
way to avoid invalidation of a law is to avoid it being challenged at all.  Selecting a 
topic that is politically or popularly ripe is a key strategy to help avoid challenge.  
In addition, to gain the bolstering effect that democratic experimentalism may or 
should offer, legislatures should be sure to select policy areas that are appropriate 
for this type of legislative approach.  Selecting a policy area for which democratic 
experimentalism can offer a helpful framework can strengthen the law by provid-
ing a sound theoretical basis for its purpose.  Not only, then, can the democratic 
experimentalist approach help provide improved substantive outcomes, it also 
offers procedural promise in helping justify and uphold laws in certain well-
suited policy areas. 
For example, in the policy issue at hand, the tide of public opinion is turning 
against the use of antibiotics in meat and several large food companies have now 
committed to phasing out the use of antibiotics in their products over the next 
decade.239  This turn of events forces their suppliers to change their production 
practices to meet the anticipated large demand from McDonald’s, Subway, 
Panera, and numerous other companies.  It may not be politically palatable for 
  
238. Alex Zielinski, California Takes a Stand on Antibiotics in Livestock, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 4, 
2015), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2015/11/04/3719085/ca-antibiotics-ban-influence [https: 
//perma.cc/BS4U-THHU]. 
239. See, e.g., Hackett, supra note 77; Strom, supra note 77. 
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meat producers to challenge the California law given that demand from companies 
and from the public is turning against the use of antibiotics in animal agriculture.  
The poultry and the beef industry groups in California have both stated that this 
movement toward phasing out the use of antibiotics is inevitable and reflects the 
trajectory of industry practice.240  As opposed to five years ago when the industry 
denied that antibiotics were a problem, the political climate today has changed 
significantly, and industry, including both livestock producers and restaurant 
chains, acknowledge that they now “care about antimicrobial resistance.”241 
To take another example, California recently passed two laws that require 
that egg-laying hens “be confined only in ways that allow these animals to lie 
down, stand up, fully extend their limbs and turn around freely,” and that ban the 
sale of eggs from hens not confined to those standards.242  The law was chal-
lenged for improperly burdening interstate commerce and under implied 
preemption grounds.243  It was not industry that challenged the law, however; six 
other states sued California.244  The case was dismissed for lack of standing.245  It 
has been suggested that egg producers have not, and perhaps will not, challenge 
the laws because of the potential “public relations debacle” that would ensue from 
shedding light on industrial farming practices.246  The egg producers’ support of 
a provision in the 2014 Farm Bill that would have phased out the use of close 
confinement cages if passed suggests that industry players may have strategically 
decided to concede this issue.  The time for California’s legislation was therefore 
ripe—even if the law does improperly burden interstate commerce or is 
preempted, it is unlikely a court will ever rule on the merits of the case because 
the implicated industry decided it was not in its best interest to challenge the law.  
California’s timing for passing legislation on this issue was prescient and could 
contribute to the law’s permanence despite its potential legal shortcomings. 
The California antibiotics law also showcases the value of taking into account 
the strength of the relevant federal regime and prior case law.  The federal regime 
is murky in the area of antibiotics, consisting of a federal statute and voluntary 
agency guidelines.  Furthermore, the minimal prior case law in this area involves 
  
240. Zielinski, supra note 238. 
241. Id. 
242. Proposition 2, Standards for Confining Farm Animals (Cal. 2008), http://www.smartvoter.org/ 
2008/11/04/ca/state/prop/2 [https://perma.cc/69CW-7QAG]; Bill No. AB 1437 (Cal. 2009), 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1401-1450/ab_1437_bill_20100706_chaptered.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5PE-E6JD]. 
243. Missouri v. Harris, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
244. Id. at 1062. 
245. Id. at 1063. 
246. Diana R.H. Winters, The Benefits of Regulatory Friction in Shaping Policy, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
228, 233–34 n.32 (2016). 
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distinguishable fact patterns from two district court cases, including one case 
from outside of California that was decided thirty years ago.247  The lack of clear 
preemptive effect and compelling prior case law bolsters the California antibiotics 
law.  Lawmakers may be well served to attempt to replicate these circumstances 
to the extent possible when selecting areas in which to legislate in the future. 
The lesson from these two California legislative experiences relates to the ex 
ante process of legislating, cautioning lawmakers to carefully vet and select issues 
for legislation after considering the salience of the issue in the public arena and 
the current state of public opinion, the potential democratic experimentalism can 
offer as a legislative approach, the federal regime in place, and the strength of the 
case law on point. 
2. Substantive Law Writing 
The California law also shows the benefits of deliberative, calculated law 
writing to maximize the chances of success if challenged.  First, it is important to 
identify and explicitly articulate compelling legislative objectives.  Protecting 
health and safety is among the most compelling state objectives; in these cases, 
courts begin with the presumption that “state or local regulation of matters related 
to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.”248  In con-
trast, laws that aim to protect animal welfare and even the environment are not 
afforded the same deference.249  Lawmakers seeking to enact laws to protect health 
and safety should therefore explicitly articulate this purpose and point to their basis 
for concern, particularly where there is strong scientific evidence available, to help 
boost the law’s chance of success.  In addition, when states are also legislating 
via democratic experimentalist processes, they should also link this legislative 
approach with the compelling state objective in health and safety.  Doing so can 
serve to mutually reinforce both democratic experimentalism as a valuable state 
process, and protecting public health and safety as a legitimate state aim.  Linking 
democratic experimentalism and the protection of health and safety can bolster 
  
247. See Animal Legal Def. Fund Bos., Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 278 (D. Mass. 
1986), aff’d, 802 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. 
Harris, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
248. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985). 
249. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund Bos., Inc., 626 F. Supp. at 280; Ass'n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 
1147; Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 633 F. Supp. 2d 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff’d, 615 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that city regulations relating to fuel economy 
standards were preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Clean Air Act).  
But see Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 557–59 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that prolonging 
the lives of horses by banning horse slaughter is a legitimate state interest, and ultimately finding 
that FMIA does not preempt). 
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both as more and more states use these justifications to support their legislative 
efforts. 
Other law writing strategies that can maximize the chance of surviving a 
challenge are to tailor legislation to prior case law and, relatedly, to avoid bur-
dening interstate commerce.  California legislators have done so in SB-27, for 
example, by banning subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in the state while not 
banning the sale of meat treated with subtherapeutic antibiotics.  Making this 
distinction in the law avoids burdening interstate commerce and implicating the 
dormant commerce clause, helping maximize the law’s chances of survival given 
the willingness of courts to invalidate laws that discriminate against out-of-state 
producers.250  Making this distinction also indicates that California has taken 
seriously the lessons from the courts in Association des Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies 
du Quebec v. Harris.251  By not banning the sale of meat—and thereby not condi-
tioning the sale of meat on a certain process of production, broadly interpreted as 
an ingredient requirement—California increases the chances that the law will not 
run afoul of Association des Éleveurs and will not be found to trigger the express 
preemption clauses under FMIA and PPIA.252  Because courts have found that 
there is a comprehensive, preemptive federal regime regulating the sale of meat in 
interstate commerce, California’s purposeful approach in legislating to make its 
intent clear serves the state well in avoiding implicating that regime.  By tailoring 
its legislation to prior case law, California has set an example for other states that 
wish to pursue a legislative solution to the problem of antibiotic resistance.  
CONCLUSION 
The use of antibiotics in food-producing animals in the United States poses 
a serious threat to public health.  For the past several decades, the livestock and 
poultry industries have relied on administering routine, low doses of antibiotics to 
food-producing animals as a cheap method of promoting faster growth and to 
sustain their cramped and unsanitary system of production.  The result has been 
  
250. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing unreasonable burdens on 
interstate commerce.  See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994) 
(“Discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment is per se 
invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous 
scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest”); Bibb v. Navajo Freight 
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959) (holding that an Illinois statute requiring the use of a 
specific type of mudguard on trucks and trailers rather than customary straight mudguards placed 
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce despite being a nondiscriminatory local safety 
measure). 
251. See Ass'n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1146; see also supra note 190. 
252. See Ass'n des Éleveurs, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1146. 
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the rapid spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria among food-producing animals, 
which is then transferred to humans through various environmental and foodborne 
means.  Because this system is thought to boost industrial agriculture’s profit 
margin and because scientists lack data to bring transparency to the extent of the 
threat these practices pose, the practices have been allowed to continue.  For years, 
the federal government has neglected to act while the negative impact of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria has grown and now threatens to become an untenable public 
health crisis.  After years of impasse, California has become the first entity to 
break through the political gridlock and enact meaningful legislation banning the 
use of antibiotics in food-producing animals for both production and disease 
prevention purposes.  For the first time ever in the United States, a law will require 
data collection on antibiotic use that will help equip scientists, policymakers, and 
firms with the evidence they need to craft effective laws and practices to combat 
human antibiotic resistance.  The scientific uncertainty in how best to reduce 
antibiotic use efficiently and effectively means this problem is not one for 
traditional command-and-control legislation to solve.  Instead, layered democratic 
experimentalism offers a powerful framework for problem-solving in this context. 
California’s law, if implemented strategically and robustly and using a layered 
democratic experimentalist framework, has groundbreaking potential.  Not only 
might it significantly reduce dangerous antibiotic use in California, it could also 
enable, for the first time in the United States, more accurate tracking of the 
problem and data pooling on best local practices to solve it.  This approach could 
result in more effective and better-shared solutions.  This new, layered iteration of 
democratic experimentalism would harness the power of private firm innovation 
within a system of centralized, coordinated data sharing facilitated by the state, all 
under the umbrella of an articulated federal objective.  Because California is a 
large and influential state—and has the third largest livestock industry in the 
country—the effect of this law and this theoretical framework for implementing 
the law could extend beyond state borders, affecting meat production not only in 
California but also nationally.  If other states follow suit with their own legislation 
and data collection, state experiences could be compared and best legislative prac-
tices would begin to emerge. 
Despite a strong case against preemption, however, the California law is at 
risk of invalidation on preemption grounds.  Both because there is an over-
whelming state interest in protecting public health in this area and because the 
law does not impede federal objectives—and indeed, actually furthers them—it 
should not be invalidated on preemption grounds if challenged.  Even so, a court 
could plausibly find either way on the matter.  Democratic experimentalism, 
however, provides a basis for rethinking federal preemption doctrine in this 
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context, bolstering the argument against preemption.  Preemption doctrine 
should evolve to favor the democratic experimentalist approach in these contexts 
where the problem at issue is knowledge-intensive and marked by scientific un-
certainty, and particularly where there is a threat to public health. 
The tide of public opinion in the United States is shifting against the routine 
use of antibiotics in livestock.  Several major companies have committed to 
eliminating or reducing meat raised with antibiotics in their supply chains over 
the next decade, but we cannot afford to solely rely on voluntary private action 
from major food companies to address this serious threat to public health.  Nor 
can we afford to do so on the leisurely timetable of a decade or more that these 
companies have set forth.  If the federal government continues to refuse to act, 
the fate of state action in this area is of critical concern.  California’s law is an im-
portant first step in the right direction.  It must be implemented effectively to 
ensure optimal effect, and it must be joined by other states if we are to successfully 
address this looming public health crisis.  Legally requiring judicious use of 
antibiotics in livestock across the United States and for meat entering the United 
States is vital to protecting human health from the ongoing threat of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria and to reducing antibiotic use worldwide.  Applying a layered 
democratic experimentalist framework and using that framework to bolster the 
argument against preemption could have considerable effect on both the state of 
human health in the decades to come as well as on the manner in which we 
legislate to solve the pressing problems of our time. 
